Lowry v. Cabletron Systems, Inc.
973 F. Supp 77, 6 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1425, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13420 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A complaint sufficiently alleges a 'disability' under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) if it claims a physical impairment substantially limits a major life activity, such as working, by significantly restricting the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs, even if the individual can perform other job classes. Additionally, employer personnel policies outlined in employee handbooks can create an implied employment contract, limiting at-will employment and requiring due process before termination.
Facts:
- Doris Lowry, born January 24, 1944, suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, muscle spasms, back injuries, knee problems, and arthritis for several years, which were caused or aggravated by her work at Cabletron Systems, Inc.
- Cabletron was aware of Lowry’s physical conditions throughout the entire course of her employment.
- Lowry had been promoted multiple times and received the highest possible salary increase following periodic performance reviews.
- Lowry’s immediate supervisor, Rick Nichols, frequently asked her to perform physical production line work that was not part of her regular supervisory duties, which Lowry consistently refused due to her physical ailments.
- Nichols and other supervisory personnel told Lowry’s subordinates that 'they were just looking for an excuse to get rid of her.'
- On July 5, 1995, Cabletron informed Lowry she was being terminated due to unsatisfactory work performance, but in doing so, deviated from its personnel policies requiring a warning and other procedures.
- Cabletron later told the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Lowry was terminated following her arrest for marijuana possession, but by immediately terminating her, Cabletron did not follow its own policy of counseling and aiding employees with drug-related problems.
Procedural Posture:
- Doris Lowry filed a charge of discrimination based on sex, age, and physical ability with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights (NHCHR) on December 29, 1995.
- The NHCHR did not process or investigate Lowry's charge, but instead directed her to file her claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- Lowry then filed a charge with the EEOC on March 22, 1996.
- Lowry received a notice of dismissal and right to sue from the EEOC on May 23, 1996, giving her 90 days from that date to file a suit in federal court.
- Lowry filed her complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire on August 21, 1996.
- Cabletron Systems, Inc. (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss Lowry's seven-count complaint.
- Lowry filed an objection to the defendant's motion to dismiss, arguing it was premature due to a lack of discovery.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff's complaint sufficiently allege: (1) a 'disability' under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and causation for discrimination claims under the ADA, Title VII, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to survive a motion to dismiss; (2) a private right of action under New Hampshire's Law Against Discrimination (RSA 354-A); (3) a claim for wrongful discharge under New Hampshire law; (4) a claim for breach of employment contract based on personnel policies under New Hampshire law; and (5) a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Hampshire law, when challenged by a motion to dismiss?
Opinions:
Majority - DEVINE, Senior District Judge
Yes, the complaint sufficiently alleges a 'disability' under the ADA and causation for federal discrimination claims, and a breach of contract claim under state law, to survive dismissal. However, no, the state law claims for discrimination under RSA 354-A, wrongful discharge, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, along with any Section 1983 claim, do not survive dismissal. For the ADA claim, the court assumed Lowry's conditions constituted a 'physical impairment' and focused on whether they 'substantially limited' a 'major life activity,' specifically working. Citing EEOC regulations (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)) and interpretive guidance, the court reasoned that inability to perform 'a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes' constitutes a substantial limitation, even if other job classes can be performed. Lowry's allegation that her impairments precluded her from 'all production line work,' as opposed to a narrow subclass of jobs as in McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., could meet this standard, making the disability claim viable at the motion to dismiss stage. The court also found that the allegations, including supervisory statements and deviation from policies, sufficed to show causation for the ADA, Title VII, and ADEA claims, and that the ADA's illegal drug use exclusion did not apply because the employer allegedly acted based on her disability, not drug use. For the state law claims, the court dismissed the RSA 354-A claim, citing precedent that it provides no private right of action. The wrongful discharge claim was dismissed because Lowry failed to allege termination for performing public policy-encouraged acts or refusing public policy-condemned acts. The breach of contract claim, however, survived, as the court found that allegations of Cabletron deviating from its personnel policies regarding warnings, due process, and drug counseling sufficed to allege an implied employment contract modifying at-will status. Lastly, the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim was dismissed because, when related to termination of at-will employment, it was subsumed by the dismissed wrongful discharge claim, and when related to discretion in contract performance, the complaint failed to allege facts supporting the employer's requisite degree of discretion.
Analysis:
This case serves as a crucial example of the deferential Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard, demonstrating that plaintiffs need only plead plausible facts, not prove their case, to proceed. It provides valuable insight into the interpretation of 'disability' under the ADA, clarifying the distinction between a 'single, particular job' and a 'class of jobs or a broad range of jobs,' a critical element for future disability discrimination claims. Furthermore, the ruling highlights the importance of scrutinizing state-specific anti-discrimination statutes and common law claims, as not all offer private rights of action or align perfectly with federal standards, while also affirming that employer personnel policies can create enforceable contractual obligations.
