Lowery v. Euverard
497 F.3d 584, 2007 WL 2213215, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18600 (2007)
Rule of Law:
School officials may regulate student speech in voluntary extracurricular athletic programs where there is a reasonable forecast that such speech, like a petition directly challenging a coach's authority, will substantially disrupt team unity or undermine the coach's ability to maintain discipline, without violating the First Amendment.
Facts:
- Derrick Lowery, Jacob Giles, Joseph Dooley, and Dillan Spurlock were students at Jefferson County High School and members of the varsity football team during the 2005-06 school year.
- Many players, including Lowery, Giles, Dooley, and Spurlock, became dissatisfied with head coach Euverard's coaching methods, alleging he struck a player, threw away recruiting letters, humiliated players, used inappropriate language, and required year-round conditioning in violation of high school rules.
- In early October 2005, Giles typed a petition stating, "I hate Coach Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for him," with the intention of presenting it to Principal Schneitman after the football season to have Euverard replaced.
- Giles and Dooley asked other players to sign the petition, and eighteen players, including Spurlock, eventually signed it.
- Coach Euverard learned of the petition on October 7, 2005, and, along with Principal Schneitman, decided to question the players individually about it.
- On October 10, during individual interviews, Lowery became insubordinate when questioned, and Giles and Dooley stood by him, refusing to meet individually with Euverard, which led Euverard to tell the three players to pick up their things and leave the team.
- As Giles, Dooley, and Lowery were leaving, Dooley encouraged other players to leave the team with them.
- On October 11, Spurlock confirmed to Coach Euverard that he had signed the petition and did not want to play for Euverard, after which Euverard told him he was no longer on the team; other players who signed but apologized were allowed to remain on the team.
Procedural Posture:
- Lowery, Giles, Dooley, and Spurlock (Plaintiffs) filed suit in federal district court on December 9, 2005.
- Euverard and Schneitman (Defendants) filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity.
- The district court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment on August 22, 2006, holding that there was an issue of fact regarding whether the petition disrupted the team.
- Defendants timely appealed the denial of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment protect high school football players from dismissal from a voluntary athletic team for circulating a petition stating "I hate Coach Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for him," if school officials reasonably forecast that such speech would substantially disrupt team unity and undermine the coach's authority?
Opinions:
Majority - Lawrence P. Zatkoff
No, the First Amendment does not protect high school football players from dismissal from a voluntary athletic team for circulating a petition directly challenging a coach's authority, because school officials may reasonably forecast that such speech will substantially disrupt team unity and undermine the coach's ability to maintain discipline. The court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment, finding no First Amendment violation by the school officials. The court applied the framework established in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., which allows school officials to regulate speech that materially and substantially interferes "with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." However, it emphasized that the Tinker analysis is highly contextual, and student-athletes, who voluntarily participate in extracurricular programs, are subject to more restrictions than the general student body. The court drew an analogy between student-athletes and government employees in voluntary programs, citing Connick v. Myers for the principle that managers of government programs can restrict conduct, including speech, that threatens the program's purpose. The petition, stating "I hate Coach Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for him" and intended to get the coach fired, constituted a direct challenge to the coach's authority. The court determined that it was reasonable for school officials to forecast that such speech would undermine the coach’s leadership and sow disunity among the team, especially given the insubordinate actions of some plaintiffs during the team meeting. Importantly, Tinker does not require actual disruption to have occurred, only a reasonable forecast of potential disruption, and school officials are not obligated to wait for certainty of a disturbance before acting. The dismissal did not impede the students' regular education, and they remained free to express their opinions outside of the team context.
Concurring - Ronald Lee Gilman
No, the First Amendment right was not clearly established at the time of the violation, thus the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, even though the student-athletes' petition likely constituted protected speech under Tinker and the school failed to meet its burden of forecasting substantial disruption. Judge Gilman concurred in the judgment, but strongly disagreed with the majority's First Amendment analysis. He believed the students' petition constituted protected speech under Tinker and argued that the defendants failed to demonstrate sufficient facts to reasonably forecast substantial disruption. He criticized the majority for "grafting the public-concern requirement of Connick v. Myers onto the Tinker test," which he deemed an unprecedented approach in student-speech cases and inconsistent with existing Supreme Court and circuit precedent, including Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. and Morse v. Frederick. Gilman contended that vague notions of "teamwork" and "unity" are not compelling school interests that would justify the suppression of speech in the same way as, for example, preventing illegal drug use. Despite finding that a constitutional violation likely occurred, Judge Gilman concluded that the First Amendment right, as it applied to student-athletes in this specific context within the circuit, was not "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation, thereby entitling the defendants to qualified immunity.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the Tinker standard to student speech in voluntary extracurricular athletic programs, carving out a specific context where school authority to maintain discipline and unity is paramount. By analogizing student-athletes to government employees under Connick, the Sixth Circuit expands the circumstances in which schools can regulate student speech without actual disruption, emphasizing the unique "top-down" authority structure of athletic teams. This decision provides greater deference to school officials in managing voluntary activities and could impact how student protests or criticisms are handled in sports or other competitive, team-oriented school programs, potentially limiting students' perceived free speech rights in these specific contexts.
