Loving v. United States
517 U.S. 748, 135 L. Ed. 2d 36, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3593 (1996)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Congress may delegate to the President the authority to prescribe aggravating factors for capital offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Such a delegation does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, particularly given the President's constitutional role as Commander in Chief.
Facts:
- Dwight Loving was a private in the United States Army, stationed at Fort Hood, Texas.
- On December 12, 1988, Loving murdered two taxicab drivers from the nearby town of Killeen.
- During the same incident, Loving attempted to murder a third taxicab driver.
- The third driver managed to disarm Loving and escape.
- The following day, civilian and Army authorities arrested Loving.
- After his arrest, Loving confessed to the murders.
Procedural Posture:
- Dwight Loving was tried by an eight-member general court-martial.
- The court-martial found Loving guilty of premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the UCMJ.
- During the sentencing phase, the court-martial found three aggravating factors based on the Presidentially-promulgated Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 1004 and sentenced Loving to death.
- The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence.
- Loving appealed to the United States Army Court of Military Review (an intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the sentence.
- Loving then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (the highest military court), which also affirmed, rejecting his constitutional challenges.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the President, acting pursuant to a congressional delegation, violate the separation of powers doctrine or the Eighth Amendment by prescribing the aggravating factors that permit a court-martial to impose the death penalty?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No. The President's prescription of aggravating factors for military capital cases, pursuant to a delegation from Congress, does not violate the separation of powers. The Constitution grants Congress the power to make rules for the military, and this power includes the ability to delegate authority to the President, whose role as Commander in Chief provides him with independent authority and expertise over military matters. Congress delegated this authority through Articles 18, 36, and 56 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which empower the President to prescribe punishments and court-martial procedures. This delegation is constitutional because it contains an 'intelligible principle' to guide the President; in the military context, the President's constitutional duties as Commander in Chief themselves provide sufficient guidance, making a highly detailed legislative directive unnecessary. The cooperation between Congress and the President in this area upholds, rather than violates, separation of powers principles.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Agrees with the majority's delegation analysis but writes separately to emphasize that the case does not resolve whether the 'service connection' requirement, which the Court eliminated in Solorio v. United States, should still apply in capital cases. Because Loving's victims had a connection to the military, that substantial constitutional question was not presented here and remains open for a future case.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
Agrees with the judgment but rejects the majority's extensive historical analysis of English military law as irrelevant to interpreting the U.S. Constitution's written text. The Constitution plainly gives Congress the power to regulate the military and does not forbid delegating implementation to the President as Commander in Chief. Additionally, Justice Scalia argues that Congress does not 'delegate' legislative power at all; rather, it assigns responsibilities to the Executive, which is permissible so long as the assignment is not so broad as to be a de facto transfer of the legislative function itself.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Agrees with the judgment but questions the underlying assumption that the Eighth Amendment's complex capital punishment rules for civilians apply to the military. If they do not, then aggravating factors are not constitutionally required, and the delegation question is moot. Even assuming they do apply, the unique nature of the military and the shared constitutional authority of Congress and the President over it require unparalleled deference, making the President's actions clearly constitutional without resort to nonmilitary delegation cases. Like Justice Scalia, he finds the majority's reliance on English history irrelevant.
Analysis:
This decision affirms the broad authority of the President in the realm of military justice, particularly when acting with congressional approval. It demonstrates the Supreme Court's significant deference to the political branches on military matters. The ruling interprets the nondelegation doctrine flexibly, suggesting that when Congress delegates power to the President in an area where he already possesses independent constitutional authority, such as his Commander-in-Chief powers, the requirement for a highly specific 'intelligible principle' is greatly relaxed. This strengthens the executive's hand in regulating the armed forces and makes separation-of-powers challenges in the military context more difficult to sustain.
