Lovell v. Griffin
303 U.S. 444 (1938)
Rule of Law:
A municipal ordinance that prohibits the distribution of literature of any kind without first obtaining permission from a city official, who has unlimited discretion to grant or deny the permit, is an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Facts:
- The City of Griffin, Georgia, enacted an ordinance making it a nuisance to distribute any 'circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind' without first getting written permission from the City Manager.
- Alma Lovell was a Jehovah's Witness who considered herself 'sent by Jehovah to do His work.'
- Lovell distributed religious pamphlets and magazines within the City of Griffin.
- Lovell did not apply for or obtain a permit, believing that doing so would be an act of disobedience to God's commandment.
- The distributed literature was not alleged to be obscene, offensive, or advocating for unlawful conduct.
Procedural Posture:
- Alma Lovell was convicted in the Recorder's Court of the City of Griffin for violating the ordinance.
- The Superior Court of Spalding County refused to sanction her petition for review.
- Lovell (appellant) appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which affirmed the lower court's judgment, upholding the ordinance.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia denied Lovell's application for a writ of certiorari.
- Lovell (appellant) then appealed the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a city ordinance that bans the distribution of any literature without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager violate the freedom of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Hughes
Yes. The city ordinance is invalid on its face because it constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press. The ordinance subjects the freedom of the press to license and censorship, which the First Amendment was designed to prevent. This freedom is not limited to newspapers and periodicals but necessarily includes pamphlets and leaflets, which are vital vehicles for information and opinion. The court reasoned that 'liberty of circulating' is as essential to freedom of the press as 'liberty of publishing,' and the ordinance's broad prohibition on all distribution, at any time or place, without a permit, strikes at the very foundation of this freedom. Because the ordinance gives the City Manager complete discretion without any guiding standards, it functions as a system of censorship. As the ordinance is void on its face, Lovell was not required to apply for a permit before challenging its constitutionality.
Analysis:
This decision firmly incorporated freedom of the press, including the liberty to distribute literature, into the liberties protected against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment. The ruling establishes a strong precedent against prior restraints, particularly laws that grant government officials unfettered discretion to permit or deny expressive activities. By allowing a 'facial challenge,' the Court enabled individuals to defy an unconstitutional licensing law without first submitting to the invalid process. This significantly impacts how regulations on speech and distribution are drafted, requiring them to be narrow, content-neutral, and guided by clear standards to be constitutionally permissible.
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