Lovejoy v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad
59 Colo. 222 (1915)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is liable for a servant's negligence when the servant, while engaged in their employment and in charge of a dangerous instrumentality, creates or knowingly maintains a dangerous condition that causes injury, even if an initial act leading to the condition was outside the strict scope of employment, especially when dealing with vulnerable individuals like children.
Facts:
- The defendant operates a spur or branch railroad track running from its main line near Leadville to the Ibex mining property.
- An engineer was in sole charge of the conduct and operation of the defendant’s engine and train on this track.
- The engineer stopped the engine and cars where the branch line crossed a public highway.
- A few days prior, the engineer had taken the five-year-old plaintiff and his brother and sister on the engine for a ride.
- On the day of the accident, the engineer called to the plaintiff, asked if he wanted to ride, and lifted him into the engine's cab.
- The engineer then started his engine forward in the line of his employment, leaving the plaintiff unguarded and uncared for in the cab.
- The plaintiff fell off the engine, and the wheels of the tender ran over and crushed one of his legs, requiring amputation.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant railroad company.
- The defendant filed a demurrer to the complaint, arguing that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
- The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer.
- The plaintiff elected to stand upon his complaint.
- The plaintiff brought the case to the Colorado Supreme Court for review.
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Issue:
Does an employer railroad company bear liability for injuries to a child caused by its engineer who, while operating a train, invited the child onto the engine and then started the train, leaving the child in a known dangerous position?
Opinions:
Majority - Scott, J.
Yes, an employer railroad company does bear liability for injuries to a child caused by its engineer who, while operating a train, invited the child onto the engine and then started the train, leaving the child in a known dangerous position. Justice Scott clarified that while the complaint's allegations of negligent hiring were insufficient and the 'attractive nuisance' (turntable) doctrine did not apply to an actively operated engine, the core issue was the engineer's actions within the line of his employment. The court distinguished between a servant departing entirely from their employment (for which the master is not liable) and departing from or neglecting a duty in the line of that employment (for which the master is liable). Citing Euting v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. and Pittsburgh C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Shields, the court emphasized that even if the act of inviting the child onto the engine was outside the engineer's authority, the subsequent failure to remove the child from a known dangerous position and then starting the engine constituted a breach of duty inherent in operating a dangerous instrument. The engineer was in sole charge of the engine, and it was his duty to keep unauthorized persons, especially young children, off it, or to safely remove them if discovered. The court likened the situation to a 'last clear chance' scenario, where the engineer had actual knowledge of the child's peril and the power to prevent the injury. The continuous transaction of placing the child, leaving him unguarded, and operating the engine was inexcusable negligence by the servant performing his duties, making the railroad company responsible. Justices Gabbert, C. J. and Carrigues, J., concurred.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the doctrine of respondeat superior by distinguishing between a servant's complete departure from employment and a departure from a duty within their employment. It broadens the scope of employer liability for acts involving dangerous instrumentalities and vulnerable plaintiffs, emphasizing that an employee's knowledge of a dangerous situation, coupled with the means to mitigate it while performing authorized duties, can create employer liability even if the initial creation of the danger was technically outside the employee's explicit instructions. This could impact future cases by making it harder for employers to escape liability simply by claiming an employee's act was unauthorized, especially in industries involving inherent risks.
