Loveday v. State
74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W.2d 116, 1976 Wisc. LEXIS 1344 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's intoxicated or drugged condition resulting from a drug or alcohol addiction is not 'involuntarily produced' for the purpose of the involuntary intoxication defense under sec. 939.42(1), Stats. The defense of involuntary intoxication is limited to conditions produced by force, fraud, or mistake.
Facts:
- The defendant consumed a substantial amount of alcohol and drugs on the day of the incident.
- The defendant and his friend, Jose Arredondo, left the defendant's girlfriend's house with a shotgun.
- They encountered the victim, George Socha, Jr., on the street, and a fight ensued between Arredondo and the victim.
- The defendant observed the fight, believing Arredondo had the advantage.
- The victim was shot and killed with the shotgun.
- Following the shooting, the defendant and Arredondo fled to the defendant's house.
- The defendant hid the shotgun underneath his mattress and concealed the spent shotgun shell in his sister's closet.
- The defendant later told an acquaintance, Pedro Garza, that he had shot the victim.
Procedural Posture:
- The defendant was charged with first-degree murder and tried in a Wisconsin trial court.
- At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of his drug addiction to support an involuntary intoxication defense, but the trial court excluded this testimony.
- The trial court also excluded expert psychiatric testimony offered to support a voluntary intoxication defense.
- A jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder.
- The defendant's post-conviction motions were denied by the trial court.
- The defendant appealed the judgment of conviction and the orders denying his post-conviction motions to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's drug addiction render their resulting drugged condition 'involuntarily produced' for the purpose of asserting the involuntary intoxication defense under sec. 939.42(1), Stats.?
Opinions:
Majority - Hanley, J.
No, a defendant's drug addiction does not render their drugged condition 'involuntarily produced' under the statute. The court holds that sec. 939.42(1), Stats., should be interpreted to exclude addiction as a basis for involuntariness. This conclusion is based on three considerations: (1) it effectuates the legislative intent that 'involuntary' applies only to intoxication induced by force, fraud, or mistake; (2) it avoids asking a jury to resolve complex and disputed medical questions about the compulsive nature of addiction; and (3) an addicted defendant is not left without a defense, as they may still argue voluntary intoxication negated the specific intent required for the crime. The court explicitly withdraws prior language from 'Roberts v. State' and 'Staples v. State' that suggested severe addiction could support an involuntary intoxication defense.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope of the involuntary intoxication defense in Wisconsin by establishing a bright-line rule that addiction cannot be its basis. By explicitly overruling its own prior dicta, the court resolved an inconsistency in state law and created a clear distinction between the voluntary and involuntary intoxication defenses. The ruling forces defendants with substance abuse issues to rely solely on the voluntary intoxication defense, which requires proving their condition negated the requisite 'mens rea' (criminal intent), a standard distinct from the 'right versus wrong' test of the involuntary defense. This holding clarifies the law for practitioners and lowers the chance of juries being confused by complex testimony on the nature of addiction.
