Love v. Cramer
414 Pa.Super. 231, 606 A.2d 1175 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is valid where a plaintiff observes a discrete, identifiable, and traumatic event, such as a loved one's fatal heart attack, that is proximately caused by a defendant's earlier negligence, even if the negligent act and the resulting injury are separated in time.
Facts:
- In the summer of 1988, Marlene Love began experiencing health problems, including fluid retention and difficulty breathing.
- Her daughter, Robin Love, became concerned her mother had a coronary condition and took her to their long-time physician, Dr. Bernard Cramer.
- During the office visit, Robin Love expressed her concerns about a potential heart condition to Dr. Cramer and inquired about testing or hospitalization.
- Dr. Cramer advised both Robin and Marlene Love that further tests and treatment were not necessary.
- Over the next six weeks, Marlene Love's condition did not improve and she was seen by Dr. Cramer on several more occasions, but he did not investigate the possibility of a heart condition.
- On October 9, 1988, approximately six weeks after the initial visit for these symptoms, Marlene Love died of heart failure.
- Robin Love was resting by her mother's side at the time and was forced to witness her mother's death.
- As a result of witnessing her mother's death, Robin Love suffered severe depression, nightmares, stress, and intense anxiety, requiring prolonged psychological treatment.
Procedural Posture:
- Robin Love, as administratrix of her mother's estate, filed a wrongful death and survival action against Dr. Cramer in the trial court.
- Within the same complaint, Robin Love asserted a personal claim against Dr. Cramer for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
- Dr. Cramer, the defendant, filed preliminary objections to the complaint, seeking to dismiss the NIED claim.
- The trial court granted the defendant's preliminary objections and dismissed Robin Love's claim for NIED.
- Robin Love, as appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff state a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress when she witnesses both a doctor's negligent failure to diagnose a condition and, weeks later, the resulting fatal traumatic event, even though the negligent act and the injury were not simultaneous?
Opinions:
Majority - Montemuro, J.
Yes. A plaintiff states a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under these circumstances. The claim is sustained because the plaintiff experienced a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the discrete, identifiable, and traumatic event of her mother's fatal heart attack. The fact that the doctor's negligence occurred weeks prior does not bar the claim, as long as the negligence constituted the proximate cause of the witnessed injury and the resulting emotional trauma. The court reasoned that Love witnessed both the negligent omission (the failure to test) and the resulting traumatic event (the death), which is sufficient to allow her the opportunity to prove the causal connection. The court also found that her alleged depression, nightmares, and anxiety were sufficient physical manifestations of emotional suffering to sustain the cause of action.
Dissenting - Cirillo, J.
No. The plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should have been dismissed. The dissent argues that the plaintiff's emotional distress was not the result of a 'sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,' as required by the precedent set in Sinn v. Burd. The alleged negligence (Dr. Cramer's advice) occurred approximately seven weeks before the death. Therefore, the plaintiff did not observe the negligent act and the resulting injury contemporaneously, which is a required element of the foreseeability test.
Concurring - Del Sole, J.
Yes. The concurring opinion agrees with the majority's result to allow the claim to proceed. However, the author writes separately to state that he would not limit recovery only to cases where the plaintiff witnessed the alleged negligent act itself. He believes witnessing the resulting traumatic injury should be sufficient to state a claim.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the application of the 'contemporaneous observance' requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims, particularly in the context of medical malpractice. By separating the negligent act (omission) from the resulting traumatic injury, the court allows claims where the two events are not simultaneous. This ruling establishes that witnessing the traumatic result of earlier negligence is sufficient, provided a causal link can be proven. Consequently, it opens the door for more NIED claims in cases of medical misdiagnosis or failure to treat, shifting the legal focus from observing the moment of negligence to observing the tragic, ultimate consequence of that negligence.
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