Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Creighton
106 Ky. 42, 50 S.W. 227, 1899 Ky. LEXIS 38 (1899)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A court may set aside a jury's compensatory damage award as excessive if the amount is so large that it 'strikes the mind at first blush' as being disproportionate to the actual pecuniary loss sustained, particularly in wrongful death cases involving a young child whose future earning capacity is entirely speculative.
Facts:
- On April 30, 1895, a freight train was moving at four to five miles per hour along Saratoga street in Newport, Kentucky.
- An organ grinder playing on the opposite side of the street attracted the attention of three young children, including William Stock, aged three to four.
- Minnie Creighton, who was standing nearby, called for the children to stop as they started to cross the street toward the music.
- Two children stopped, but William Stock continued running across the street in front of the approaching train.
- Seeing that the engineer was not looking ahead at the track, Creighton screamed and then rushed onto the track in an attempt to rescue the child.
- The train struck and killed William Stock.
- The engine then struck Minnie Creighton, inflicting severe injuries, including a fractured skull and hip.
Procedural Posture:
- Minnie Creighton filed an action against the railroad company in a Kentucky trial court for personal injuries.
- The administrator of William Stock's estate filed a separate wrongful death action against the same railroad company in the same court.
- The two cases were tried together before a jury.
- The jury returned a verdict for Minnie Creighton in the amount of $17,500.
- The jury returned a verdict for the administrator of Stock's estate in the amount of $10,500.
- The railroad company (appellant) appealed both judgments to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's highest court at the time, arguing the verdicts were excessive.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Are jury awards for personal injury and wrongful death considered excessive and subject to reversal when they are so large as to strike the court as disproportionate to the actual pecuniary loss, particularly when calculating the potential earnings of a deceased young child?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Hobson
Yes, the jury awards are excessive because they are so large as to strike the mind as disproportionate to the pecuniary loss sustained and are not justified by the evidence. For the death of the child, William Stock, the measure of damages is limited to fair compensation for the destruction of his capacity to earn money. A child so young has an entirely speculative future earning capacity, subject to the uncertainties of childhood diseases and life itself; therefore, a verdict of $10,500 is excessive when compared to awards for adults with proven earning records. For Minnie Creighton's injuries, while severe, she lost no limbs, retained her faculties, and her earning capacity was not destroyed. Comparing her $17,500 award to verdicts in other cases involving arguably more severe permanent injuries, the court finds it excessive. The court concluded the jury was likely swayed by sympathy for Creighton's heroic act and the tragedy of the situation, leading to a verdict not based on a dispassionate calculation of pecuniary damages.
Dissenting - Judge Guppy
No, the jury's damage awards are not excessive and should be upheld, as their reversal is a 'palpable invasion of the province of the jury.' For the death of the child, the majority's rule limiting damages to net future earnings is contrary to the Kentucky Constitution and wrongly implies that the right to life itself has no value. This rule would absurdly prevent recovery for the deaths of children, the elderly, or any person who does not earn more than their living expenses. The jury is better qualified than the court to speculate on the child's potential. For Minnie Creighton, her injuries—including a fractured skull, exposed brain, fractured hip, premature aging, and the risk of losing her mind—are catastrophic and fully justify the $17,500 verdict. The court has no legal right to substitute its judgment for the jury's absent evidence of passion or prejudice.
Analysis:
This decision exemplifies the tension between the role of the jury in assessing damages and the appellate court's supervisory power to review awards for excessiveness. It establishes a restrictive 'pecuniary loss' standard for wrongful death damages for minors, significantly limiting recovery by focusing on speculative future earnings rather than the intrinsic value of life. The powerful dissent highlights a fundamental disagreement over the measure of damages, arguing the majority's approach undermines the constitutional right to recover for wrongful death. This case sets a precedent for courts to overturn verdicts they deem emotionally driven and not grounded in a strict calculation of financial loss.
Unlock the full brief for Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Creighton