Louisiana Ex Rel. Francis v. Resweber
1947 U.S. LEXIS 2777, 67 S. Ct. 374, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
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Rule of Law:
A state's second attempt to carry out a capital sentence, after the first attempt failed due to an accidental mechanical malfunction, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such an event does not constitute double jeopardy or cruel and unusual punishment when there is no evidence of a purpose to inflict unnecessary pain.
Facts:
- Willie Francis, a citizen of Louisiana, was convicted of murder.
- In September 1945, Francis was sentenced to death by electrocution.
- On May 3, 1946, state officials placed Francis in the official electric chair to carry out the sentence.
- The executioner activated the switch, but due to a presumed mechanical difficulty, the electric current was not sufficient to cause death.
- Francis was removed from the chair and returned to his prison cell.
- The Governor of Louisiana subsequently issued a new death warrant to carry out the execution at a later date.
Procedural Posture:
- Willie Francis was convicted of murder in a Louisiana state trial court and sentenced to death.
- After the first execution attempt failed, Francis filed applications for writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
- Francis, the petitioner, argued that a second execution attempt would violate his federal constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied the applications, finding no basis for judicial relief.
- The United States Supreme Court granted Francis's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state's second attempt to execute a convicted murderer, after the first attempt failed due to an unforeseeable mechanical malfunction, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by constituting double jeopardy or cruel and unusual punishment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Reed
No, the second execution attempt does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the failed execution was an unforeseeable accident with no suggestion of malevolence by state officials. Regarding double jeopardy, the court analogized the situation to a retrial after a conviction is reversed on appeal, which is permissible; this was not a second punishment, but the continuation of the first. On the cruel and unusual punishment claim, the Court distinguished between cruelty inherent in a method of punishment and the suffering caused by an accident. The Constitution forbids the wanton infliction of pain, but not the suffering from an unforeseeable event that prevents the humane consummation of a sentence. The psychological strain on the petitioner, while severe, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Burton
Yes, the second execution attempt violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The dissent argued that while the first attempt's failure was unintentional, the second attempt would be a deliberate, intentional reapplication of electric current. This transforms the punishment from an instantaneous death, which is the only reason electrocution is considered constitutional, into a 'death by installments.' The dissent contended that it is difficult to draw a line between two attempts and five, and that any reapplication of current after the first attempt constitutes a form of torture that is cruel, unusual, and unconstitutional. The case should be remanded to determine the facts of what occurred during the first attempt.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No, the second execution attempt does not violate the Due Process Clause. The concurrence stated that the Due Process Clause prohibits state actions that offend a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' While the situation is personally reviling, an 'innocent misadventure' by the state does not meet this high standard. A judge must not enforce a personal view of what is fair but must be guided by a 'consensus of society's opinion.' He concluded that he could not say it would be 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind' for Louisiana to proceed, but noted that a series of failed attempts or a willfully cruel attempt might present a different constitutional question.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the scope of the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. It establishes a critical distinction between suffering inherent in a state-sanctioned method of punishment and suffering caused by an unforeseen accident in its application. By focusing on the state's lack of 'purpose to inflict unnecessary pain,' the Court set a high bar for inmates to challenge executions on these grounds, requiring evidence of intentional cruelty rather than mere negligence or accident. The case also represents a key moment in the debate over the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, with Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence articulating a standard based on fundamental fairness and societal conscience rather than a mechanical application of the first eight amendments.
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