Loughran v. Kummer

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
146 A. 534, 297 Pa. 179 (1929)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

When a deed, absolute on its face, is manually delivered by the grantor to the grantee, title passes immediately and irrevocably. A contemporaneous oral condition that the deed not be recorded until the grantor's death is legally ineffective and does not prevent the consummation of the gift or render the conveyance revocable.


Facts:

  • An appellee, a 67-year-old bachelor, owned land in Pittsburgh.
  • He conveyed the land for one dollar to Mrs. Rummer, his tenant.
  • The appellee signed, sealed, and physically delivered the deed directly to Mrs. Rummer.
  • The appellee claimed he delivered the deed with the oral condition that Mrs. Rummer not record it until after his death.
  • Within a few days of the delivery, the appellee demanded that Mrs. Rummer return the deed.
  • Mrs. Rummer then deceived the appellee by telling him she had destroyed the deed, though she had not.

Procedural Posture:

  • The appellee (grantor) filed a bill in equity in the trial court seeking to set aside a deed he had given to Mrs. Rummer (appellant/grantee).
  • The trial court found for the appellee and entered a decree cancelling the deed.
  • The trial court based its decision on the finding that the deed was delivered on the condition that it not be recorded until the grantor's death, which it concluded made the gift revocable.
  • Mrs. Rummer, the defendant, appealed the trial court's decree to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

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Issue:

Does an oral condition that a deed not be recorded until the grantor's death, attached to an otherwise absolute and physically delivered deed, render the transfer of title incomplete and revocable by the grantor?


Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Kephart

No. An oral condition that a deed not be recorded until the grantor's death does not make an otherwise absolute and physically delivered deed revocable. The formal acts of signing, sealing, and delivering a deed create a strong legal presumption that the grantor intended to pass title immediately. To overcome this presumption, the grantor must provide clear, precise, and convincing proof that no delivery was intended and none was made. In this case, the grantor's own testimony shows he intended for the grantee to have the land, with his only concern being when the transfer would take effect. An oral condition regarding recordation is merely a promise that relies on good faith and has no legal effect on the transfer of title. Allowing such parol conditions to invalidate a formal deed would undermine the security of written instruments and real estate titles. The law requires parties to use the proper legal means to achieve their objectives, such as an escrow with a third party, and will not give effect to intentions that are not executed through the correct legal channels.



Analysis:

This decision strongly reinforces the legal finality of deed delivery and the importance of the written instrument in property law. It serves as a significant application of the parol evidence rule to real estate conveyances, holding that extrinsic oral agreements cannot alter the absolute nature of a delivered deed. The case clarifies that a grantor's subjective intent regarding the timing of a gift is legally irrelevant if the objective act of physical delivery to the grantee is completed. This precedent solidifies the principle that to create a conditional or future transfer of property, a grantor must use a legally recognized mechanism, such as a will, trust, or a true escrow arrangement with a neutral third party, rather than relying on informal instructions to the grantee.

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