Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
568 US 78, 184 L. Ed. 2d 547, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 597 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
The flow of water from an improved portion of a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the same waterway does not constitute a “discharge of a pollutant” under the Clean Water Act, as it does not involve the “addition” of pollutants to navigable waters from a point source.
Facts:
- The Los Angeles County Flood Control District (District) operates a “municipal separate storm sewer system” (MS4), which is a drainage system that collects, transports, and discharges storm water.
- The Clean Water Act (CWA) and its implementing regulations require operators of certain MS4s to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit before discharging storm water into navigable waters.
- The District holds an NPDES permit for its MS4.
- The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and Santa Monica Baykeeper (Baykeeper) alleged that water-quality measurements from monitoring stations within the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers demonstrated that the District was violating the terms of its permit.
- These monitoring stations for the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers are located in "concrete channels" constructed for flood-control purposes.
- Water, including pollutants detected at these stations, flows out of the concrete-lined portions of the rivers into lower, unlined portions of the same rivers.
Procedural Posture:
- The Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) and Santa Monica Baykeeper (Baykeeper) filed a citizen suit against the Los Angeles County Flood Control District (District) and others in the District Court under §505 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).
- The District Court granted summary judgment to the District on the claims, concluding the record was insufficient to find the MS4 had discharged the standards-exceeding pollutants.
- The NRDC and Baykeeper appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (appellant: NRDC and Baykeeper, appellee: District).
- The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding that the District was liable for the discharge of pollutants that occurred when polluted water flowed out of the concrete-lined portions of the rivers into lower, unlined portions of the same rivers.
- The Los Angeles County Flood Control District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of the United States granted (petitioner: District, respondents: NRDC and Baykeeper).
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Issue:
Does the flow of water out of an improved, concrete-lined portion of a navigable river into a lower, unimproved portion of the same river qualify as a “discharge of a pollutant” under the Clean Water Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No, the flow of water out of an improved portion of a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the same waterway does not qualify as a “discharge of a pollutant” under the Clean Water Act. The Court reaffirms its holding in South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U. S. 95, 109–112 (2004), that transferring polluted water between “two parts of the same water body” does not constitute a discharge of pollutants under the CWA. The CWA defines “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” Under a common understanding of the word “add,” no pollutants are “added” to a water body when water is merely transferred between different portions of that water body. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which held that a discharge occurred when polluted water detected at monitoring stations flowed out of concrete channels into lower, unlined portions of the same rivers, was inconsistent with this interpretation and Miccosukee. The Court explicitly declined to address the alternative argument that the permit’s terms alone established liability for upstream discharges, as that issue was not embraced within the narrow question on which certiorari was granted.
Concurring - Justice Alito
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment without offering separate reasoning.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the interpretation of "discharge of a pollutant" under the Clean Water Act, reinforcing the "unitary water body" theory established in Miccosukee Tribe. By emphasizing that the mere movement of water within a single water body, even if through engineered improvements, does not constitute an "addition" of pollutants, the Supreme Court limits the scope of NPDES permit requirements for internal transfers. This decision could impact how environmental agencies and permittees address pollution that originates upstream but is detected downstream within the same water system, potentially shifting the focus from internal transfers to the original point of addition into the navigable waters. It also highlights the importance of precise framing of issues for Supreme Court review.
