Lorillard, A Division of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons
434 U.S. 575 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
When Congress enacts a new statute that incorporates the enforcement procedures of a pre-existing law, it is presumed to have also adopted the established judicial interpretations of those procedures, including the right to a jury trial, unless it expressly indicates otherwise.
Facts:
- Pons was an employee of Lorillard.
- Lorillard discharged Pons from her employment.
- Pons alleged that her discharge was motivated by her age.
- Pons believed this action by Lorillard violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
Procedural Posture:
- Pons filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Lorillard, in the United States District Court.
- In her complaint, Pons alleged she was discharged in violation of the ADEA and demanded a jury trial on all issues of fact.
- Lorillard filed a motion to strike Pons's jury trial demand.
- The District Court granted Lorillard's motion, ruling there was no right to a jury trial in ADEA cases.
- The District Court then certified the issue for an interlocutory appeal.
- Pons, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, with Lorillard as appellee.
- The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's order, holding that there is a right to a jury trial on the claim for lost wages.
- Lorillard, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts.
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Issue:
Does the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) grant a right to a jury trial in a private civil action for lost wages?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) provides a statutory right to a jury trial in private actions for lost wages. The Court based its decision on statutory construction, finding it unnecessary to reach the Seventh Amendment constitutional question. The ADEA's enforcement provision, § 7(b), explicitly directs that the Act be enforced using the 'powers, remedies, and procedures' of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). At the time the ADEA was enacted, it was well-established through uniform judicial interpretation that private actions for lost wages under the FLSA included a right to a jury trial. The Court presumes Congress was aware of this interpretation and intended to adopt it when it incorporated the FLSA's procedures. This presumption is strengthened by Congress's selective modification of other FLSA provisions, suggesting that what it did not change, it intended to keep. Furthermore, the ADEA authorizes suits for 'legal or equitable relief,' and the term 'legal' is a term of art indicating remedies (like money damages) for which a jury trial is traditionally available.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the procedural rights of plaintiffs bringing claims under the ADEA by confirming their right to a jury trial for lost wages. It establishes a significant principle of statutory interpretation: legislative incorporation of a prior statute's procedural framework includes the judicial 'gloss' on that framework unless Congress expressly states otherwise. This reinforces the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, as the Court resolved the issue on statutory grounds without needing to interpret the Seventh Amendment. The case also clearly distinguishes the procedural mechanisms of the ADEA from those of Title VII, setting a precedent for analyzing employment statutes based on their specific remedial language rather than their substantive similarities.
