Loretta M. Aliotta v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16, 60 Fed. R. Serv. 290, 315 F.3d 756 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Under Illinois law, a common carrier owes the highest degree of care to individuals who, with the actual or implied consent of the carrier, are on a platform with the intent to board a train, and this elevated duty extends to the design and safety of platforms that make passengers vulnerable to accidents involving the movement or operation of trains.
Facts:
- Joseph Aliotta, 69, a frequent train traveler from Gilman, Illinois, often took Amtrak trains to Chicago.
- In late 1996, Amtrak changed its schedules, and the express train no longer stopped at Gilman.
- On July 30, 1997, Joseph called Amtrak and was told the train to Chicago would be at Gilman station at 7:30, which turned out to be the schedule for an evening train, not the morning express train.
- On the morning of July 31, Loretta Aliotta drove Joseph to the Amtrak station, where he waited on a narrow 'island platform' with tracks on both sides.
- The morning express train passed through Gilman without stopping, and Joseph was found dead about 180 feet down the tracks from the platform.
- The exact circumstances of Joseph's death were disputed: plaintiff's witnesses suggested he was impacted by the side of the train or 'sucked under' due to the narrow platform, while defense witnesses claimed he was crossing the tracks and hit head-on.
- The 'island platform' was only five feet wide, too narrow to paint yellow warning lines, and there were no signs warning passengers not to stand there while trains were passing.
Procedural Posture:
- Loretta Aliotta, widow and executor of Joseph Aliotta's estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), Illinois Central Railroad Company (IC), and Gary Gilmer (an Amtrak engineer) in state court.
- The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois by Amtrak.
- A jury verdict was entered against Loretta Aliotta in the District Court.
- Loretta Aliotta appealed the adverse judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by giving jury instructions that narrowly defined a 'passenger' as only someone 'in the act of boarding' and limited a common carrier's highest duty of care only to the 'operation of the train,' thereby failing to accurately reflect Illinois law regarding the duty owed to individuals waiting on a platform to board a train?
Opinions:
Majority - Cudahy, Circuit Judge
Yes, the trial court erred by providing jury instructions that inadequately defined 'passenger' and restricted the scope of a common carrier's highest duty of care under Illinois law, thereby prejudicing the plaintiff. The court first addressed the exclusion of defendant IC's Risk Manager Thomas Prendergast's deposition testimony about a 'vacuum effect' near high-speed trains. While the testimony was not admissible as expert scientific testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 702 and Daubert (due to unreliability), the court found it did qualify as a party-opponent admission under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) because it concerned matters within the scope of Prendergast's employment investigating accidents. However, even as an admission, the testimony was properly excluded when offered for the truth of the scientific matter because Rule 801(d)(2) does not trump Rules 701(c) and 702 regarding unreliable scientific knowledge. The court also upheld the exclusion of a photograph of the deceased's body under Fed.R.Evid. 403, finding its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The central issue for reversal, however, concerned the jury instructions. The court found that while a repetitive instruction on Joseph Aliotta's duty of ordinary care was not prejudicial, the instructions regarding Amtrak's duty of care were erroneous. The trial court's definition of 'passenger,' based on IPI 100.09, as a person 'in the act of boarding,' was too narrow under Illinois law as clarified by Katamay v. Chicago Transit Authority. Katamay and other Illinois cases (Lake Street Elevated Railroad Co. v. Burgess, Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Jennings, Chi. Terminal Transfer R.R. Co. v. Schmelling, Pa. Co. v. McCaffrey) demonstrate that a person at a place provided for passengers (such as a platform) with the intention of taking passage, and with the actual or implied consent of the carrier, is considered a passenger, especially when the accident involves the train's operation. This broadens the class beyond merely being 'in the act of boarding.' Furthermore, the trial court improperly refused to give an instruction based on IPI 100.15, which dictates a common carrier's highest degree of care in 'selecting a place for [passengers] to board ... its vehicles.' Citing Katamay and Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Wilson, the court concluded this duty extends to the design and safety of station platforms concerning the dangers posed by moving trains. The trial court's limitation of Amtrak's highest duty to only 'with regard to the operation of the train' was also found too restrictive. The court concluded that these inaccurate and misleading instructions likely confused the jury and prejudiced the plaintiff, as a proper understanding of Illinois law could have led the jury to find Joseph Aliotta was a passenger, necessitating assessment of Amtrak's negligence under a more stringent standard.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interpretation of 'passenger' status and the scope of a common carrier's highest duty of care under Illinois law, particularly concerning accidents on platforms. It confirms that the elevated duty applies not only to those in the physical act of boarding but also to individuals present on the platform with intent to board, under the carrier's implied or actual consent, especially when train movement is involved. This ruling could increase liability for common carriers regarding platform design and safety, requiring them to consider potential dangers posed by all passing trains to those waiting on platforms, not just those actively boarding a stopped train. It also reaffirms that while employee admissions can be non-hearsay, they are still subject to other evidentiary rules like reliability standards for scientific testimony.
