Lopiano v. Lopiano
1998 Conn. LEXIS 454, 752 A.2d 1000, 247 Conn. 356 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
Under Connecticut's 'all-property' equitable distribution scheme, a personal injury award acquired during a marriage is considered marital property in its entirety, including components for future pain and suffering and future lost wages, and is subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution.
Facts:
- Richard C. Lopiano and Shelley Lopiano were married in 1967.
- Richard served in the Vietnam War, sustained war wounds, and was later diagnosed with chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, for which he was found to be 100 percent disabled and received Veterans' Administration benefits.
- Throughout the marriage, Richard struggled with alcohol and cocaine use and had several arrests, while Shelley remained supportive through his medical, psychological, and legal difficulties, even during long periods of separation.
- In February 1992, while working in construction, Richard sustained severe physical injuries that caused him to be 100 percent physically disabled.
- Richard pursued a negligence action which, in 1996, resulted in a jury award of $2,820,000, allocated among past and future pain and suffering, past and future lost earnings, and past medical expenses.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard C. Lopiano initiated a dissolution action against Shelley Lopiano in the Connecticut Superior Court (trial court).
- The trial court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage and issued financial orders.
- The trial court ordered Richard to pay Shelley 25 percent of the net recovery from his pending personal injury action, as well as periodic alimony and attorney's fees.
- Richard Lopiano, the plaintiff, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court.
- The Supreme Court of Connecticut transferred the appeal from the Appellate Court to itself for decision.
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Issue:
Does a personal injury award, including compensation for future pain and suffering and future lost wages, constitute 'property' subject to equitable distribution under General Statutes § 46b-81 in a marriage dissolution action?
Opinions:
Majority - Katz, J.
Yes, a personal injury award in its entirety constitutes property subject to equitable distribution under § 46b-81. Connecticut's 'all-property' equitable distribution scheme is broad and does not limit the definition of property by its source, timing, or method of acquisition. The personal injury award represents a presently existing, enforceable interest, not a mere expectancy, thus classifying it as property. The court rejects the 'analytic approach,' which would segregate the award into marital and separate components, in favor of a literal approach where the entire award is deemed marital property, leaving the equitable division to the trial court's discretion based on statutory factors.
Dissenting - Berdon, J.
No, a personal injury award should be subject to the 'analytic approach' to determine which portions constitute marital property. This court's precedent in Bornemann v. Bornemann requires an analysis of the purpose for which an asset was granted to determine if it was 'earned' during the marriage. Compensation for pain and suffering to be endured and wages to be lost after the dissolution of the marriage is not earned during the marriage and therefore does not constitute a marital asset subject to property division under § 46b-81. Such future-looking components should instead be considered as part of the spouse's future income stream for the purpose of alimony.
Dissenting - Norcott, J.
No, portions of a personal injury award representing post-dissolution lost wages and pain and suffering should not constitute property under § 46b-81. Pain and suffering are uniquely personal to the injured spouse, not the marital estate. Similarly, an award for future lost wages compensates for an earning capacity that would have existed outside the marriage, and those future wages would not have been marital property. The majority incorrectly characterizes the award as final when it was on appeal, making it an inchoate claim, and by its holding, the court implicitly and improperly decides that even inchoate claims are marital property.
Dissenting - McDonald, J.
No, the court should adopt the 'analytic approach' because compensation for personal pain and suffering and future lost wages are not 'fruits of the marriage.' These components are deeply personal to the injured spouse and do not arise from the shared marital enterprise. It is inequitable for an uninjured spouse to profit from the other's future suffering and disability. Many other states have adopted the analytic approach based on principles of fairness and equity, which this court should follow to distinguish between marital assets and compensation for personal losses that extend beyond the marriage.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Connecticut's status as a pure 'all-property' jurisdiction, setting it apart from the majority of states that use an 'analytic approach' to classify personal injury awards. By defining the entire award—including compensation for future losses—as marital property, the court simplifies the 'classification' stage of asset division. However, it places a significant burden on the trial court's discretion during the 'distribution' stage to weigh the statutory factors and achieve an equitable outcome, especially considering the personal nature of pain and suffering damages. The ruling provides a clear, albeit controversial, precedent that any presently existing award acquired during the marriage is part of the divisible estate.
