Lopez v. Miller
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7262, 2013 WL 165015, 915 F.Supp.2d 373 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney's failure to call available alibi witnesses, without a reasonable strategic justification, constitutes deficient performance that prejudices the defense when the prosecution's case relies on a single, unreliable eyewitness whose testimony is contradicted by other evidence, thereby violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Facts:
- On August 31, 1989, a drug dealer named Elvirn Surria was shot and killed with a shotgun in a Brooklyn crackhouse.
- Daisy Guadalupe Flores Lopez, an employee at the crackhouse who was sober, came face-to-face with the shooter and described him as a 'tall, dark, black' man over 6'3". William Lopez is 5'7" and light-skinned.
- Janet Chapman was also present in the crackhouse, but was in a separate room during the shooting. She admitted to being on a two-day crack binge and having smoked 10-12 vials of crack in the two hours prior to the incident.
- Chapman's account changed multiple times: she initially told prosecutors she only heard the shot, then testified at trial that she saw William Lopez shoot Surria, and later recanted her testimony entirely, stating Lopez was not at the scene and her testimony was a 'pure fabrication' due to prosecutorial pressure.
- William Lopez informed his trial attorney that his mother-in-law, Helen Guido, and sister-in-law, Lydia Rivera, could testify that he was with them around the time of the murder.
- After the trial, an inmate named Earline Cafield, who was incarcerated with Chapman, sent a letter stating that Chapman had told her someone other than Lopez committed the murder.
- Years later, Cesar Diaz, who was also in the crackhouse and witnessed the murder, testified that he was certain William Lopez was not the shooter and described the killer as a 'black, dark-skinned' man.
Procedural Posture:
- William Lopez was charged with murder in New York Supreme Court, Kings County.
- Following a jury trial before Justice Carolyn Demarest, Lopez was convicted of second-degree murder and related weapons offenses.
- Lopez was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life in prison.
- Lopez’s direct appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, was denied on the merits.
- Lopez's pro se motion for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was dismissed as untimely.
- Lopez filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis with the Appellate Division, claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which was denied.
- Lopez filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
- The district court initially dismissed the petition as time-barred under AEDPA.
- On a motion for reconsideration, the district court reopened the case based on a colorable claim of actual innocence and appointed counsel.
- The federal case was stayed to allow Lopez to exhaust his state court remedies.
- Lopez filed a motion to vacate his conviction in New York Supreme Court, presenting new evidence including alibi witness affidavits.
- Justice Demarest denied the motion to vacate without holding an evidentiary hearing.
- Lopez's applications for leave to appeal Justice Demarest's decision to the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals were denied.
- Lopez returned to federal court and filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which is the subject of the present opinion.
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Issue:
Does a defense attorney's failure to call two available alibi witnesses, in a case where the prosecution's evidence consisted of a single, highly questionable eyewitness and was contradicted by another eyewitness, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Garaufis, J.
Yes. A defense attorney's failure to call available alibi witnesses under these circumstances constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. To reach this constitutional claim, the court first determined that Lopez made a credible and compelling showing of actual innocence, thereby excusing his untimely habeas petition. The court then applied the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington. First, counsel's performance was deficient because the failure to call the alibi witnesses was not a reasonable trial strategy; the only justification offered—that the witnesses were family—is insufficient, particularly when the prosecution's case was extremely weak and counsel presented no alternative defense. Second, the deficient performance prejudiced Lopez because, given the flimsy nature of the state's evidence which rested entirely on one highly impeachable eyewitness, there is a reasonable probability that testimony from two alibi witnesses would have created reasonable doubt and changed the outcome of the trial.
Analysis:
This case is a significant application of the 'actual innocence' gateway, demonstrating how federal courts can use new evidence to overcome procedural bars like the statute of limitations in habeas petitions. The opinion serves as a powerful critique of a state court's failure to adequately adjudicate a meritorious claim, highlighting that a state court's refusal to hold a necessary evidentiary hearing can amount to an 'unreasonable determination of the facts' under AEDPA. It strongly reinforces the principle that an attorney's duty to investigate and present exculpatory evidence is paramount, especially in a 'credibility contest' where the defendant's liberty hangs on the word of a single, unreliable witness.
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