Lopez v. Clifford Law Offices, P.C.
299 Ill. Dec. 53, 362 Ill. App. 3d 969, 841 N.E.2d 465 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney who gives incorrect legal advice upon withdrawing from a case may be liable for legal malpractice if that advice proximately causes the client's injury, even if the attorney-client relationship ended before the statute of limitations expired. A client's subsequent consultation with another attorney who declines representation does not, as a matter of law, constitute a superseding cause that absolves the first attorney of liability.
Facts:
- On February 20, 2001, Jose Lopez's daughter, Elizabeth, drowned in a pool allegedly maintained by the Rockford School District.
- Shortly thereafter, Lopez retained the Clifford Law Offices (Clifford firm) to represent him and his daughter's estate in a wrongful death action.
- On August 20, 2001, Thomas Prindable, an attorney at the Clifford firm, sent a letter to Lopez terminating the representation with six months remaining on the applicable statute of limitations.
- The termination letter incorrectly advised Lopez that the statute of limitations for the wrongful death action was two years.
- The actual statute of limitations against the Rockford School District, a local public entity, was one year from the date of death, expiring on February 20, 2002.
- In September 2001, after receiving the letter, Lopez consulted with another attorney, Joseph Loran, about the case.
- On October 5, 2001, Loran sent a letter to Lopez declining to take the case.
- Relying on the two-year deadline, Lopez did not retain a new attorney until after the one-year statute of limitations had expired, causing his wrongful death claim to be time-barred.
Procedural Posture:
- Jose Lopez sued the Clifford Law Offices and Thomas Prindable (Clifford defendants) in the circuit court for legal malpractice.
- Lopez subsequently amended his complaint to add William King, the referring attorney, as a defendant.
- The Clifford defendants filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, arguing the malpractice action was barred because they withdrew while the underlying wrongful death case was still viable.
- The circuit court granted the Clifford defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice.
- Lopez's motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied by the circuit court.
- The circuit court subsequently granted a similar motion to dismiss filed by defendant King.
- Lopez, as appellant, appealed both dismissals to the Appellate Court of Illinois, where the cases were consolidated.
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Issue:
Does an attorney's incorrect advice regarding the statute of limitations constitute a proximate cause of a client's injury, even when the attorney withdraws from representation before the statute of limitations has run and the client subsequently consults with another attorney who declines the case?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Gordon
Yes. An attorney's incorrect advice regarding the statute of limitations can be a proximate cause of a client's injury, even if the attorney withdraws before the statute has run and the client consults another attorney who declines representation. Giving incorrect advice on a settled point of law, such as a statute of limitations, is prima facie negligent conduct because it can lull a client into a false sense of security and undermine their urgency in seeking new counsel. The defendants' reliance on the 'viability' defense, where a successor counsel's involvement breaks the chain of causation, fails here because no successor counsel was retained before the statute of limitations ran. A mere consultation with an attorney who declines representation, like Loran, does not constitute a superseding cause that shifts all duty and responsibility from the original negligent attorney. Therefore, whether the Clifford firm's negligent advice was the proximate cause of Lopez's injury is a question of fact for the trier of fact, making dismissal improper.
Analysis:
This decision limits the 'viability' defense in legal malpractice, establishing that affirmatively providing incorrect legal advice upon withdrawal is a distinct form of negligence. It clarifies that a client's mere consultation with a subsequent attorney who declines representation is not a superseding cause that automatically severs the causal link to the first attorney's negligence. The ruling underscores that the foreseeability of a client's reliance on parting advice is a key factor, shifting the proximate cause determination from a matter of law to a question of fact. This increases the duty of care for withdrawing attorneys, as they may be held liable for misstatements even if the client theoretically has time to discover the error.
