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Juana Zoraida Lopez-Telles v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
564 F.2d 1302 (1977)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Immigration judges do not possess statutory or inherent authority to terminate deportation proceedings for purely humanitarian reasons. Their powers are strictly limited to those explicitly conferred by statute or delegated by the Attorney General.


Facts:

  • The petitioner is a citizen and native of Nicaragua.
  • In 1973, a major earthquake in Nicaragua destroyed the petitioner's home and possessions and killed her relatives.
  • Shortly after the earthquake, she received a visa to visit the United States for a period of six months.
  • The petitioner remained in the United States after her six-month visa expired.

Procedural Posture:

  • The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued an order to show cause against the petitioner for overstaying her visa.
  • At a deportation hearing before an immigration judge, the petitioner conceded deportability but requested that the proceedings be terminated for humanitarian reasons.
  • The immigration judge denied the request, ruling he had no authority to grant it, and ordered the petitioner to be deported.
  • The petitioner appealed the judge's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which is an administrative appellate body.
  • The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision.
  • The petitioner then filed a petition for review of the BIA's decision with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

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Issue:

Does an immigration judge have the statutory or inherent discretionary authority to terminate deportation proceedings solely for humanitarian reasons?


Opinions:

Majority - Per Curiam

No. An immigration judge lacks the statutory or inherent authority to terminate deportation proceedings on purely humanitarian grounds. Immigration judges are creatures of statute whose powers are defined and limited by Congress and the Attorney General. The detailed statutory and regulatory schemes governing immigration proceedings contain no provision granting judges such broad, equitable power. The vesting of such authority would be anomalous given the exacting eligibility requirements Congress established for other forms of discretionary relief. The court reasoned that the division between the adjudicative functions of an immigration judge and the enforcement functions of INS officials is a well-established principle, and the judge is not empowered to review the wisdom of the INS in initiating deportation proceedings.



Analysis:

This decision solidifies the principle that administrative law judges, such as immigration judges, have their authority strictly circumscribed by their enabling statutes and regulations. It clarifies that they cannot exercise broad, inherent equitable powers akin to Article III judges. The case reinforces the separation of functions within the immigration system, distinguishing the adjudicative role of the judge from the prosecutorial discretion of INS enforcement officials. Consequently, individuals seeking humanitarian relief must look to specific statutory provisions or petitions to other parts of the agency, rather than making general pleas for equity to an immigration judge during deportation proceedings.

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