Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
603 U. S. ____ (2024)
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Rule of Law:
The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority; courts may not defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute simply because the statute is ambiguous.
Facts:
- The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishing in federal waters and is administered by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).
- The MSA allows fishery management plans to require that observers be carried on board fishing vessels to collect data for conservation purposes.
- While the MSA explicitly requires certain types of fishing fleets to pay for these observers, it is silent on who must bear the cost for observers in the Atlantic herring fishery.
- Historically, the federal government had fully funded the observer program for the Atlantic herring fishery.
- In 2020, citing a lack of federal funding, NMFS promulgated a rule requiring Atlantic herring fishermen, including Loper Bright Enterprises and Relentless Inc., to pay for the federally mandated observers on their vessels.
- The NMFS estimated the cost of an observer to be up to $710 per day, which could reduce a vessel owner's annual profits by as much as 20%.
Procedural Posture:
- Loper Bright Enterprises sued the Secretary of Commerce in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (a federal trial court), challenging the observer-funding rule.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the government.
- Loper Bright Enterprises, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed in a divided decision, applying Chevron deference.
- In a separate case, Relentless Inc. sued the Department of Commerce in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island (a federal trial court) with a similar challenge.
- That District Court also granted summary judgment to the government, relying on Chevron.
- Relentless Inc., as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed, also applying Chevron.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, limiting its review to the question of whether to overrule Chevron.
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Issue:
Should the doctrine established in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., which requires courts to defer to a federal agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers, be overruled?
Opinions:
Majority - Roberts, C. J.
Yes. The Chevron doctrine is overruled because it is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), historical judicial practice, and the constitutional separation of powers. The APA, at 5 U.S.C. § 706, explicitly commands that 'the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law' and 'interpret...statutory provisions.' Chevron defied this command by requiring courts to yield their independent judgment to an agency's 'permissible' construction of an ambiguous statute. This approach contradicts the foundational principle from Marbury v. Madison that it is 'emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' The core presumption of Chevron—that statutory ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency—is a legal fiction, as ambiguity can arise from many sources other than congressional intent to delegate. Agencies possess no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities; courts do, using the traditional tools of statutory construction. Furthermore, stare decisis does not compel adherence to Chevron because its reasoning was deeply flawed (it failed even to mention the APA), it has proven unworkable and spawned a confusing web of exceptions, and it actively undermines reliance interests by permitting agencies to change legal interpretations with shifting political administrations.
Concurring - Thomas, J.
Yes. While in full agreement with the Court's opinion, Chevron must be overruled not only because it violates the APA, but more fundamentally because it violates the Constitution's separation of powers. Chevron deference improperly curbed the Article III 'judicial Power' by forcing judges to abdicate their duty of independent judgment. Simultaneously, it unconstitutionally expanded the executive's Article II power by allowing agencies to exercise what are effectively judicial and legislative powers, upsetting the constitutional structure designed to protect individual liberty.
Concurring - Gorsuch, J.
Yes. The proper application of stare decisis requires overruling Chevron. The decision was a radical break from the historical understanding of the judicial power, which has always been to exercise independent judgment. Chevron deference is inconsistent with the APA's text, defies constitutional principles like due process and the separation of powers, and subverts traditional interpretive canons like the rule of lenity. The doctrine has proven unworkable, created instability rather than reliance, and arose from an over-reading of stray language in an opinion that was not intended to be revolutionary. Overruling Chevron is not an act of judicial activism but a restoration of the judiciary's traditional, constitutionally assigned role.
Dissenting - Kagan, J.
No. Chevron should not be overruled, as it correctly recognizes that Congress generally prefers expert and politically accountable agencies, rather than generalist and unaccountable courts, to resolve ambiguities in complex regulatory statutes. Agencies possess subject-matter expertise and practical experience that courts lack, and resolving statutory gaps often involves policy choices that are the proper domain of the political branches. The majority's reliance on the APA is misplaced; Section 706 is indeterminate on the standard of review and does not forbid deference. Furthermore, pre-APA case law, which the APA was meant to codify, shows a trend toward deference in cases like Gray v. Powell. Overruling a 40-year-old cornerstone of administrative law violates principles of stare decisis, especially given the extensive reliance by Congress, agencies, and regulated parties. The majority's decision is an act of 'judicial hubris' that aggrandizes judicial power at the expense of the branches of government better equipped to make technical and policy-laden decisions.
Analysis:
This decision represents a monumental shift in American administrative law, ending a 40-year era of judicial deference to executive agencies. By dismantling the Chevron framework, the Court has significantly altered the balance of power, reallocating interpretive authority from the executive branch to the judiciary. This will likely make it easier for regulated parties to challenge agency rules, potentially leading to the invalidation of long-standing regulations across various sectors like environmental protection, public health, and finance. The ruling enhances judicial power over the administrative state and may lead to greater fragmentation in federal law as different circuits arrive at different interpretations of the same statute without the unifying force of a single agency view.
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