Loop v. . Litchfield
1870 N.Y. LEXIS 56, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870)
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Rule of Law:
A manufacturer of a defective product is not liable for negligence to a remote party who is injured by it if the product is not in its nature imminently dangerous to human life.
Facts:
- A manufacturer made a piece of machinery, a flywheel, which had defects that weakened it.
- The manufacturer sold the defective flywheel to a purchaser, Collister, for his own use.
- At the time of sale, the manufacturer pointed out the defects to Collister, who fully understood them.
- Collister used the flywheel safely for five years.
- After five years, a neighbor of Collister, the deceased, began using the machine for his own purposes.
- While the deceased was using the machine, the flywheel broke apart due to its original defects, causing his death.
Procedural Posture:
- The representatives of the deceased sued the manufacturer in the trial court for negligence.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
- The defendant-manufacturer appealed the verdict to the General Term (an intermediate appellate court).
- The General Term reversed the judgment of the trial court.
- The plaintiffs (representatives of the deceased) then appealed that reversal to the New York Court of Appeals (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Is a manufacturer liable for negligence to the representatives of a remote user who was killed by a defective machine, where the machine is not an imminently dangerous instrument and the original purchaser was fully informed of the defect at the time of sale?
Opinions:
Majority - Hunt, J.
No. The manufacturer is not liable because the flywheel was not an imminently dangerous instrument, and therefore no duty was owed to a remote user not in privity of contract. The court distinguished this case from Thomas v. Winchester, where the defendant was held liable for mislabeling a poison. Poison, like gunpowder or a loaded rifle, is an article that is inherently dangerous to human life and its sale with a false label is an act that is a natural and almost inevitable cause of death or great bodily harm. In contrast, a flywheel is not essentially an instrument of danger; it only becomes dangerous through defect or misuse, similar to a wagon wheel or a common chair. The fact that an injury occurred does not transform the product's character into an imminently dangerous one. The court reasoned that the bursting of the wheel was not the natural or expected consequence of its manufacture and sale, especially since it was used safely for five years. Thus, the general rule requiring privity of contract applies, and the manufacturer owes no duty to the deceased.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the doctrine of privity of contract in negligence actions against manufacturers, narrowing the exception for dangerous articles established in Thomas v. Winchester. By creating a distinction between products that are 'imminently dangerous' in their nature (e.g., poisons, weapons) and those that only become dangerous due to a defect, the court limited a manufacturer's duty to third parties. This decision represents a restrictive view of manufacturer liability that would later be expanded by cases like MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., which eroded the privity requirement. The case is a critical step in the historical development of modern products liability law.
