Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central
180 P.3d 321, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 570, 43 Cal.4th 201 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
An employer's failure to invoke the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) dispute-resolution mechanism, which allows for a third-party medical opinion, does not bar the employer from later claiming the employee did not have a serious health condition or was capable of performing their job. Furthermore, an employee performing a similar part-time job for another employer during a requested medical leave is evidence, but not conclusive proof, of their ability to perform their full-time job for the original employer under CFRA.
Facts:
- In 1989, Sutter Health Central hired Antonina Lonicki to work in the housekeeping department at its Roseville hospital, and by 1993, she became a certified technician in the sterile processing department.
- In June 1997, the hospital became a level II trauma center, which Lonicki stated led to a major increase in her workload and stress.
- On July 26, 1999, Lonicki's supervisor, Pat Curtis, changed her shift, denied a vacation request, and Lonicki went home upset, later calling Curtis to say she was too upset to work.
- After being asked for medical authorization, Lonicki obtained a note from a family nurse practitioner, Joe Lobacarro, recommending a one-month leave for medical reasons, and she later saw a therapist and a psychologist.
- Sutter Health Central's director, Steve Jatala, instructed Lonicki to see Dr. Michael Cohen, an occupational health physician chosen by the employer, who concluded Lonicki was able to return to work without restrictions after a brief consultation.
- Jatala informed Lonicki to return to work by August 9 or face dismissal, but Lonicki, consulting with her primary physician, Dr. Roy Harris, and a psychologist, Janice Pettis, stated she would not return until August 27.
- After Jatala sent a letter requiring Lonicki to return by August 23 or face dismissal, Lonicki consulted a psychiatrist, Dr. Frank Capobianco, who wrote a note stating she was "disabled by major depression" and required sick leave extended to September 26, 1999.
- During the period she was seeking medical leave from Sutter Health Central, Lonicki concurrently held a part-time job at Kaiser hospital, performing duties she described as substantially similar to her full-time job at Sutter, though the Kaiser job was "a lot slower."
Procedural Posture:
- Antonina Lonicki sued Sutter Health Central in state trial court, alleging violations of the CFRA for firing her and failing to follow CFRA procedures.
- Sutter Health Central moved for summary judgment in the trial court.
- The trial court granted Sutter Health Central's motion for summary judgment, concluding Lonicki's part-time job showed she could perform her essential job functions.
- Lonicki appealed the trial court's judgment of dismissal to the Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, agreeing that the CFRA requires an employee to be unable to perform essential job functions generally, not just for a specific employer.
- Lonicki filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
1. Does an employer’s failure to invoke the CFRA’s dispute-resolution mechanism of having a health care provider jointly chosen by the parties determine the employee’s entitlement to medical leave bar the employer from later claiming that the employee did not suffer from a serious health condition and was capable of performing her job? 2. If a full-time employee, during the period in which medical leave was sought, continued to perform a similar job for another employer on a part-time basis, does that conclusively establish the ability to do the job for the original employer?
Opinions:
Majority - Kennard, J.
1. No, an employer's failure to invoke the CFRA's dispute-resolution mechanism does not bar the employer from later claiming that the employee did not suffer from a serious health condition and was capable of performing her job. The statutory language states that an employer "may" resort to the third-party opinion remedy, indicating it is permissive, not mandatory. There is no language in the statute stating that failure to use this option bars the employer from challenging the employee’s medical claim in litigation. While subdivision (k)(1) of section 12945.2 states an employee's certification "shall be sufficient" if it contains certain information, this limits the type of information an employer can demand, not the employer’s choice of legal remedies or its ability to challenge the underlying validity of the leave request in court. Federal appellate courts interpreting the FMLA (which the CFRA is modeled after) have reached the same conclusion, emphasizing that "may" is permissive and does not create an estoppel. An employer who denies leave without using the dispute resolution procedure risks a lawsuit, but is not precluded from defending that lawsuit by challenging the employee's medical condition. 2. No, an employee's performance of a similar part-time job for another employer does not conclusively establish their ability to do the full-time job for the original employer. The CFRA focuses on whether a serious health condition makes the employee "unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee," meaning their specific job with their specific employer. The ability to perform a part-time job elsewhere, even if similar, does not automatically prove an ability to perform a full-time, potentially more stressful, job at the original employer. Differences in work environment, hours, and stress levels between jobs can be significant. While Lonicki’s part-time work at Kaiser is strong evidence of her ability, it is not dispositive, especially when contradicted by her own testimony and that of her treating psychologist. This creates a disputed issue of fact that must be resolved at trial, meaning summary judgment was inappropriate.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Chin, J.
I agree with the majority that an employer's failure to use the CFRA's dispute-resolution mechanism does not bar them from challenging an employee's medical leave entitlement in court. However, I dissent from the majority's conclusion on the second issue. An employee successfully performing the essential functions of an identical job, even part-time, for a similar employer should not be able to claim a serious health condition makes them unable to perform their full-time job. The CFRA's use of the "essential functions" standard, borrowed from disability discrimination law, implies an inability to perform the job functions generally, not just for a specific employer or under specific conditions. The CFRA was intended to balance workplace demands with employee needs, not to allow "capable but unwilling" employees to abuse the system, receive benefits, and hold a second job. Legislative history suggests that employees on medical leave are contemplated as being incapacitated from performing similar job duties. The plaintiff's testimony indicated she could have returned to work if conditions were changed, further supporting her ability to perform the job's essential functions.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Moreno, J.
I concur with the majority on the second issue, agreeing that performing a part-time job elsewhere is not conclusive proof of an employee's ability to perform their full-time job for the original employer. However, I dissent from the majority's holding on the first issue. I believe that under the CFRA, an employer who fails to obtain a second or third medical opinion to challenge an employee's medical certification is bound by the employee's health care provider's opinion, assuming it contains the required information. The statute's provision that a certification "shall be sufficient" means it is valid unless properly challenged through the prescribed statutory procedures (second and third opinions). While the employer "may" seek further opinions, this means they have the choice to challenge, but if they choose to challenge, they must use the statutory process. The absence of a provision allowing employers to simply ignore a valid certification and deny leave suggests this was not intended. The CFRA's purpose is to provide swift and certain job protection for employees with serious health conditions, and allowing employers to bypass the dispute resolution process undermines this goal by forcing employees into costly and time-consuming litigation over medical facts that could have been resolved by doctors at the time of the leave request. Therefore, Sutter Health Central should be estopped from contesting Lonicki's serious health condition.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the parameters of employer obligations and employee rights under the CFRA, particularly regarding medical leave for stress-related conditions. It establishes that while employers have discretion not to utilize the statutory dispute-resolution mechanism, doing so comes with the risk of litigation and does not automatically preclude the employee's claim. More importantly, the decision protects employees who, due to a specific work environment or full-time demands, cannot perform their regular job but may still be capable of less demanding or part-time work elsewhere. This ensures that the "serious health condition" standard is applied to the context of the employee's actual job, rather than a generalized ability to work. Future cases will need to carefully consider the factual nuances of an employee's primary employment versus any alternative work to determine if a serious health condition truly prevents them from performing their original position.
