Longbehn v. Schoenrock
727 N.W.2d 153, 2007 WL 332922, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 20 (2007)
Rule of Law:
A statement is defamatory per se if a reasonable listener would understand it to impute serious sexual misconduct or criminal activity, making it actionable without proof of special damages and presuming general damages; however, recovery for punitive damages requires clear and convincing evidence of deliberate disregard for the plaintiff's rights, and the amount of general damages must be supported by the evidence and not be excessive.
Facts:
- In May 2000, Patrick Longbehn began working as a police officer for the City of Moose Lake at age 34.
- Shortly after starting his employment, Patrick Longbehn began a romantic relationship with an 18-year-old woman.
- On December 31, 2000, Robin Schoenrock spoke on the phone with Charles Wilson, who was driving Robin Schoenrock's stepdaughter home from a party.
- During the phone call, Robin Schoenrock threatened to contact law enforcement if his stepdaughter was not brought home, and referred to Patrick Longbehn as "Pat the Pedophile."
- In January 2001, the City of Moose Lake chose not to retain Patrick Longbehn as a police officer after his probationary period, partly because he was known in the community by the nickname "Pat the Pedophile," which reflected a loss of public confidence.
- After his termination, Patrick Longbehn later found employment with the Minnesota Department of Corrections but was discharged for assaulting his girlfriend, and subsequently had an order for protection issued against him.
Procedural Posture:
- Patrick Longbehn (plaintiff) initially commenced this case against multiple defendants, including Robin Schoenrock, alleging various tort and employment claims in the district court (trial court).
- The district court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.
- Patrick Longbehn (appellant) appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of dismissal regarding his defamation claim against Robin Schoenrock (appellee) and remanded the case for further proceedings.
- After trial following the remand, a jury found in favor of Patrick Longbehn (plaintiff) on his defamation claim, awarding him $230,000 for general damages, $3,000 for future health-care expenses, $90,000 for special damages (wage loss), and $250,000 for punitive damages.
- Robin Schoenrock (defendant) moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).
- The district court granted Robin Schoenrock's (defendant) motion for JMOL, entering judgment in his favor and setting aside the jury's verdict, concluding that the statement was not defamatory per se, there was no causal link for any damages, the evidence for punitive damages was insufficient, and the general damages amount was insufficient. Patrick Longbehn appealed this decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Is referring to an individual as a "pedophile" defamatory per se, even if the speaker does not intend to accuse them of actually being one? 2. Must a plaintiff in a defamation per se case establish a causal link between the defamatory statement and special damages (wage loss) or provide clear and convincing evidence of deliberate disregard for punitive damages? 3. Can a jury's award for general damages in a defamation per se case, where general damages are presumed, be set aside as excessive if not supported by the evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Hudson, Judge
Yes, referring to an individual as a "pedophile" is defamatory per se, even if the speaker did not intend to accuse them of actually being one, because a reasonable listener would understand such a statement to impute serious sexual misconduct or criminal activity. The court explained that the test for defamation per se is not the speaker's intent, but whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances would understand the statement to impute a crime or serious sexual misconduct, which calling someone a "pedophile" almost always does. When a statement is defamatory per se, general damages are presumed, meaning the plaintiff does not need to prove actual harm to reputation or emotional distress. (Citing Anderson v. Kammeier, Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 570, § 574). No, a plaintiff in a defamation per se case cannot recover special damages (wage loss) without establishing a causal link between the defamatory publication and the specific pecuniary loss, and punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence of deliberate disregard for the plaintiff's rights. The court affirmed the district court's grant of JMOL on special damages because there was no evidence that Schoenrock's single statement was a "substantial factor" in Longbehn's termination or inability to find future police work, especially given other reasons for his job loss (overzealous conduct, assaulting girlfriend, OFP). Regarding punitive damages, the court held that while general damages are presumed in defamation per se, punitive damages are not automatically warranted. Minnesota Statute § 549.20, subd. 1(a) requires "clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others." The court found Schoenrock's statement, made in the context of securing his stepdaughter's safe return and believing the name was a common nickname, lacked the necessary deliberate disregard to justify punitive damages. (Citing Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 622, § 622A(a), Loftsgaarden v. Reiling). Yes, a jury's award for general damages in a defamation per se case, where damages are presumed, can be set aside as excessive if the amount is not supported by the evidence and exceeds what would normally flow from such a publication. The court acknowledged that general damages are presumed in defamation per se, removing the need for proof of causation for entitlement to general damages, and therefore reversed the district court's conclusion on that point. However, it found the jury's award of $233,000 in general damages "far exceeds the amount of past and future harm to appellant’s reputation, mental distress, humiliation, and embarrassment that would normally flow from a publication of this kind" based on the record and the context of the statement. The court cited Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. for the proposition that states have no interest in securing gratuitous awards far exceeding actual injury. Thus, the court remanded for a new trial solely on general damages. (Citing Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g Co., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621 cmt. a, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.).
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of defamation per se in Minnesota, emphasizing that while general damages are presumed, special damages still require a causal link, and punitive damages demand a high evidentiary standard of deliberate disregard. It highlights the distinction between presumed damages for reputational harm and the need for causation for economic loss. Furthermore, it underscores that even in cases of presumed general damages, appellate courts retain the authority to review and reduce excessive jury awards, balancing the presumption of harm with the principle against gratuitous awards, potentially influencing future cases where high general damage awards are challenged.
