Long v. Long
343 N.E.2d 100, 45 Ohio St. 2d 165, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 287 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
The future interest remaining in the grantor of a fee tail estate is a vested reversion. This reversion is a vested property interest that is descendible, devisable, and alienable at the time of the grantor's death, not a mere possibility of reverter that ripens upon the termination of the fee tail.
Facts:
- Henry Long conveyed real estate by deed to his son, 'Jesse S. Long, and the children of his body begotten, and their heirs and assigns forever,' creating a fee tail estate.
- Henry Long later died, leaving three children as his heirs: Jesse Long, Edward Long, and Emma Long Olinger.
- Jesse Long, the donee in tail, subsequently died without ever having any children (issue).
- Before his death, Jesse Long had conveyed his one-third share of the future interest he inherited from his father, Henry.
- Henry's other son, Edward Long, died intestate, survived by two sons, Howard and Eugene.
- Eugene Long later died testate, devising his inherited interest to his wife, Bessie Long.
- Henry's daughter, Emma Long Olinger, died intestate, survived by one son, Paul H. Olinger.
Procedural Posture:
- The case was initiated in the Probate Court of Darke County, Ohio, to determine the ownership of the real estate.
- The judgment of the Probate Court was appealed to the Court of Appeals for Darke County.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Probate Court.
- Bessie Long, as an appellant, then brought the case before the Supreme Court of Ohio for a final review of the lower courts' decisions.
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Issue:
Does the grantor of a fee tail estate retain a vested reversion that is immediately descendible, devisable, and alienable upon the grantor's death, or a mere possibility of reverter that only becomes a possessory estate in his heirs when the fee tail terminates?
Opinions:
Majority - Corrigan, J.
Yes, the grantor of a fee tail estate retains a vested reversion that is immediately descendible, devisable, and alienable. The court explained that at early common law, the grantor of a conditional fee retained a 'possibility of reverter.' However, the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus (1285) converted this bare possibility into a 'reversion,' which is a vested estate. A reversion is the residue of an estate left in a grantor that is descendible, alienable, and devisable. The Ohio statute of 1811, which limited entailments, did not alter the fundamental nature of the fee tail in the first donee or the nature of the vested reversion in the grantor. Citing precedent such as Gibson v. McNeely, the court affirmed that this reversion passes at the grantor's death to his heirs then living, who can immediately transfer their interest. Therefore, when Henry Long died, his vested reversion descended in equal one-third shares to his three children, Jesse, Edward, and Emma, and their subsequent conveyances and inheritances from those shares are valid.
Analysis:
This decision provides crucial clarity on the nature of future interests associated with fee tail estates in Ohio. By definitively classifying the grantor's retained interest as a vested reversion rather than a possibility of reverter, the court solidifies its status as a freely alienable property right from the moment of the grantor's death. This promotes certainty in land titles, as it allows heirs to know and transfer their interests without waiting for the fee tail to terminate, which could be generations later. The case serves as an important historical lesson on the evolution of property law from feudal England to modern American jurisprudence.
