Long v. Commonwealth
478 S.E.2d 324, 23 Va. App. 537, 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 730 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A legislature may abrogate a common law defense, such as necessity, by enacting a statute that specifically addresses the circumstances covered by that defense, thereby preempting an individual's ability to reweigh the competing harms at the guilt phase of a trial.
Facts:
- Patrick Raymond Long had previously been adjudicated a habitual offender, which legally revoked his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Virginia.
- On November 18, 1994, Long was driving a vehicle with his sister, Mary Jacobs, as a passenger.
- Long believed his sister was experiencing a medical emergency and needed to be taken to the hospital.
- Police Officer Sherrie Bishop initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle Long was driving.
- When stopped, Long initially provided the officer with a false name and social security number.
- Long later admitted his true identity to the officer and acknowledged that he knew he was prohibited from driving due to his habitual offender status.
Procedural Posture:
- Patrick Raymond Long was indicted in trial court for driving after having been adjudicated a habitual offender.
- The Commonwealth filed a pre-trial motion in limine to preclude Long from presenting evidence of a necessity defense.
- The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion, ruling the statute abrogated the defense on the merits.
- Long's motions to dismiss the indictment and to strike the Commonwealth's evidence were both denied by the trial court.
- Following a trial, a jury convicted Long.
- Long, as appellant, appealed the conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.
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Issue:
Does the Virginia habitual offender statute, Code § 46.2-357, which provides for mitigation of punishment in emergency situations, abrogate the common law defense of necessity as a justification for the crime of driving after being adjudicated a habitual offender?
Opinions:
Majority - Annunziata, J.
No. The Virginia habitual offender statute abrogates the common law defense of necessity. The defense of necessity is only available where the legislature has not already made a determination of values in a criminal statute. Here, the legislature considered the exact circumstances that would give rise to a necessity defense—driving in an 'apparent extreme emergency which require such operation to save life or limb'—and chose to address it in the punishment phase of the proceedings, not as a defense to the crime itself. By relegating the consideration of an emergency to sentencing, the legislature made a value judgment that there can be no guilt-nullifying justification for a habitual offender to drive. This statutory scheme encompasses the entire subject covered by the common law defense and plainly manifests the legislative intent to abrogate it for this specific offense.
Analysis:
This case serves as a clear illustration of statutory abrogation of a common law defense. It establishes the principle that where a legislature has contemplated a specific scenario (like an emergency) and provided a specific remedy within a statute (mitigation of sentence), that statutory provision will control over a more general, judge-made common law defense. This reinforces the doctrine of legislative supremacy. The decision requires defendants and courts in future cases to analyze criminal statutes to see if they implicitly or explicitly preempt common law defenses by creating their own specific framework for handling exigent circumstances.
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