Lomax v. State
2007 WL 1829371, 233 S.W.3d 302, 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 870 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
Under Texas Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3), a person can be convicted of felony murder for a death that occurs during the commission of felony Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), because the felony-murder statute plainly dispenses with a culpable mental state for the act of murder.
Facts:
- David Dale Lomax had at least two prior convictions for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI).
- Lomax operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated, with a blood-alcohol content approximately three times the legal limit.
- While driving on a crowded public street, Lomax engaged in dangerous driving behaviors, including tailgating, speeding, and weaving through traffic.
- Lomax's vehicle collided with another car.
- A five-year-old girl who was a passenger in the other car died as a result of the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- David Dale Lomax was charged with felony murder in a Texas trial court, with felony DWI alleged as the underlying felony.
- A jury found Lomax guilty of felony murder and sentenced him to 55 years in prison.
- Lomax, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Texas Court of Appeals, arguing that felony DWI cannot serve as the predicate felony for a felony-murder charge.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Lomax petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state's highest criminal court, for discretionary review, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does Texas Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3) permit a felony-murder conviction to be based on an underlying felony, such as felony DWI, that does not require a culpable mental state (mens rea)?
Opinions:
Majority - Hervey, J.
Yes, Texas Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3) permits a felony-murder conviction based on an underlying felony that lacks a culpable mental state. The court reasoned that the text of the felony-murder statute plainly dispenses with a mental element by omitting any mention of a required mens rea, unlike other subsections of the murder statute which explicitly require an 'intentional' or 'knowing' state of mind. This interpretation aligns with the historical purpose of the felony-murder rule, which is to hold individuals responsible for unintentional deaths that occur during the commission of a felony. The court overruled a portion of its prior decision in Rodriquez v. State which incorrectly suggested that the mens rea for felony murder is transferred from the underlying felony. Finally, the court held that the existence of the more specific offense of intoxication manslaughter does not preclude prosecution under the general felony-murder statute, as the plain language of § 19.02(b)(3) only excludes manslaughter, and felony DWI is not manslaughter or a lesser-included offense thereof.
Dissenting - Johnson, J.
No, a felony-murder conviction should not be based on felony DWI. The dissent argued that under the rule of statutory construction in pari materia, the specific statute governing intoxication manslaughter (§ 49.08) should prevail over the general felony-murder statute. The legislature created the specific crime of intoxication manslaughter to address deaths caused by drunk drivers, moving it out of the general manslaughter statute which had been explicitly excluded from the felony-murder rule. The dissent contended that this legislative act showed an intent for such conduct to be prosecuted exclusively under the specific statute. To allow a felony-murder charge based on the same conduct would be to elevate the title and location of the statute over its substance and legislative history.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the strict-liability nature of the Texas felony-murder rule, affirming that no culpable mental state regarding the death is required for a conviction. It significantly expands prosecutorial discretion by allowing prosecutors to charge felony murder, a first-degree felony, in cases involving deaths caused by repeat DWI offenders, rather than being limited to the intoxication manslaughter statute, a second-degree felony. By rejecting the in pari materia argument, the court gives prosecutors the option to seek a more severe punishment in DWI fatality cases where the defendant's conduct qualifies as a felony, thereby establishing a strong deterrent for habitual drunk drivers.
