Yes, the state has to stay out of it. Federal law creates a system where unions and companies can use certain peaceful 'weapons' against each other during fights over contracts. When federal law doesn't ban something like workers refusing overtime as a group, that means Congress wanted it to be a tool either side could use. It's like a fair fight where both sides know the rules. A state can't jump in and take away a weapon that federal law allows, because that would mess up the fair fight Congress set up.

No, the state should be allowed to step in. Since federal law doesn't clearly protect this tactic and doesn't ban it either, it's in a gray area. In these gray areas, states should be free to make their own rules. There's no clear sign that Congress wanted this tactic to be completely off-limits to state laws. The Court is wrong to overturn its own past decisions that let states handle these situations.

Yes, the state has to stay out of this specific fight. The state law was aimed right at this labor fight and would change who has more power. But I want to be clear: states can still enforce their normal, everyday laws. If workers break windows or hurt people during a protest, states can still arrest them for that. This decision only stops states from making special rules just to control bargaining tactics themselves.

The union's choice to say no to overtime is something that should be left alone and not controlled by state laws. The big idea is that the federal labor laws are supposed to let unions and companies figure some things out on their own, without the states getting in the way.

The union's actions aren't clearly protected or banned by the federal laws, so I think the state should be able to make its own rules about it. The Supreme Court should stick to what it's said before and let states handle these kinds of union activities.

I agree with the main decision that the state law shouldn't mess with the union's ability to push back. But I also think states should be able to use their own laws in labor disputes as long as they're not trying to tip the scales in favor of the company or the union.

Yes, the state's authority is preempted. A state's authority to enjoin a union's concerted refusal to work overtime is preempted by federal labor law because Congress intended for such peaceful economic self-help activities to be unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces between the parties. This case establishes a second line of preemption analysis, distinct from the 'Garmon' preemption which applies to conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. The crucial inquiry here is whether Congress intended the conduct to be an unregulated economic weapon available to labor or management. State regulation of such weapons is impermissible because it would upset the balance of power that Congress deliberately struck in the NLRA. The Court overrules 'Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Board (Briggs-Stratton)' to the extent it allowed state regulation of such peaceful partial strike activities, finding that its premise—that such conduct is either governable by the state or entirely ungoverned—is no longer valid.

No, the state's authority is not preempted. The Union's refusal to work overtime is neither arguably protected by § 7 nor arguably prohibited by § 8 of the NLRA, placing it in a 'no-man's land' of labor activity. The precedent set by 'Briggs-Stratton' correctly held that states may regulate conduct within this area. There is no evidence of a specific legislative intent from Congress to leave this particular form of partial strike activity wholly unregulated. Overruling 'Briggs-Stratton' is inappropriate, especially when implementing a supposed congressional intent that Congress itself has not expressed, and it disrupts stability and predictability in the law.

Yes, the state law is preempted. The state law is preempted because it directly curtails the Union's self-help capability, which significantly shifts the balance of bargaining power struck by Congress. However, this holding should not be read to preclude states from enforcing 'neutral' state laws, such as general tort or contract law, that are not directed at altering the bargaining positions of the parties but may have an incidental effect on a labor dispute. The preemption applies to state laws specifically designed to regulate the economic weapons of labor and management, not to laws of general applicability.

Yes. The concerted refusal to work overtime is an activity that Congress intended to be unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces. The state's regulation of this activity would frustrate the effective implementation of the National Labor Relations Act's processes. Therefore, the Wisconsin law, as applied in this case, is preempted by federal labor policy.

No. The partial strike activity in this case is neither protected by § 7 nor prohibited by § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. The Court's decision to preempt state regulation of such activity is not supported by a clear legislative intent from Congress, and the rule established in Briggs-Stratton should be adhered to, allowing states to regulate conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited by federal law.

Concurs with the majority opinion on the basis that the Wisconsin law directly curtails the Union's self-help capability, resulting in a significant shift in the balance of free economic bargaining power established by Congress. However, states should remain free to enforce neutral state statutes or rules of decision that are not directed toward altering the bargaining positions of employers or unions but may have an incidental effect on relative bargaining strength.

Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists v. Employment Relations. Bd.

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