Lockyer v. Andrade
538 U.S. 63 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus for a state prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim unless the state court's adjudication was contrary to, or involved an objectively unreasonable application of, the gross disproportionality principle, which has unclear contours and applies only in exceedingly rare cases.
Facts:
- Leandro Andrade had a criminal history dating back to 1982, which included three convictions for first-degree residential burglary, which qualified as 'strikes' under California law.
- On November 4, 1995, Andrade stole five videotapes worth a total of $84.70 from a Kmart store in Ontario, California.
- Andrade was apprehended by store security as he was leaving.
- Two weeks later, on November 18, 1995, Andrade stole four videotapes worth a total of $68.84 from a different Kmart store in Montclair, California.
- He was again apprehended by security personnel upon exiting the store.
- Andrade later admitted to a probation officer that he was a heroin addict and stole the videos to sell them to support his habit.
Procedural Posture:
- The State charged Andrade with two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction, prosecuting them as felonies under California's 'three strikes' law.
- A jury in a California trial court found Andrade guilty on both counts and made a special finding that he had three prior convictions for first-degree residential burglary.
- The trial court judge sentenced Andrade to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.
- Andrade appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the sentence, rejecting his claim that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
- The Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review.
- Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, which denied the petition.
- Andrade, the appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the District Court's judgment and found the state court decision to be an unreasonable application of federal law.
- The State of California, represented by petitioner Lockyer, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Did the California Court of Appeal's decision affirming a sentence of two consecutive 25-years-to-life terms for two petty thefts constitute a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law on gross disproportionality under the Eighth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Connor
No. The California Court of Appeal’s decision affirming Andrade's sentence was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The governing legal principle from this Court’s precedent is that a gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years, but its precise contours are unclear. Given this lack of clarity, the state court's decision was not objectively unreasonable. The AEDPA standard requires more than a federal court's independent judgment that the state court's decision was erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. The facts of Andrade's case fall between those of Rummel v. Estelle (which upheld a life sentence with parole) and Solem v. Helm (which struck down a life sentence without parole), meaning the case is not materially indistinguishable from a precedent requiring a different outcome. Because the Court's precedents are not a 'model of clarity' in this area, the state court had broad discretion, and its conclusion that Andrade’s sentence was constitutional was not an unreasonable application of the gross disproportionality principle.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. The state court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The precedent of Solem v. Helm is controlling, as Andrade's case is 'on all fours' with it, involving a minor triggering offense, a comparable criminal history, and a sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without parole. To disregard Solem was an error of law. Furthermore, viewing the sentence as two consecutive 25-year terms, the second term is irrational. The state’s justification for its three-strikes law is incapacitating dangerous offenders, but Andrade did not become 'twice as dangerous' by committing a second, closely related petty theft. Doubling the mandatory minimum sentence from 25 to 50 years based on a second minor offense is grossly disproportionate, and the state court's acceptance of this result was objectively unreasonable.
Analysis:
This decision significantly heightened the barrier for state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief, particularly in Eighth Amendment sentencing challenges. By emphasizing the 'unclear' nature of its own gross disproportionality jurisprudence, the Court created a wide zone of deference for state court decisions under AEDPA's 'unreasonable application' clause. The ruling clarified that a state court's decision is not 'unreasonable' merely because a federal court disagrees with it or even finds it to be clear error; it must be 'objectively unreasonable.' This holding effectively insulated many severe recidivist sentencing schemes, like California's 'three strikes' law, from federal habeas review, reinforcing principles of finality and federalism at the expense of substantive review of constitutional claims.
