Lockhart v. McCree
476 U.S. 162 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
The removal for cause of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties at the sentencing phase of a capital trial does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury or a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community.
Facts:
- On February 14, 1978, a gift shop and service station in Camden, Arkansas, was robbed, and its owner, Evelyn Boughton, was shot and killed.
- That afternoon, Ardia McCree was arrested after a police officer identified his car as matching an eyewitness's description of the getaway vehicle.
- McCree admitted to police that he was present during the murder but claimed that a stranger had taken his rifle and committed the crime.
- Two eyewitnesses contradicted McCree's account, stating they saw only one person in the car at the relevant time.
- Police later found McCree's rifle and a bank bag from the shop along a dirt road.
- Ballistics tests confirmed that the bullet that killed Boughton was fired from McCree's rifle.
- McCree was subsequently charged with capital felony murder.
Procedural Posture:
- At Ardia McCree's trial in Arkansas state court, the judge removed for cause eight prospective jurors who stated they could not under any circumstances vote to impose the death penalty.
- The jury convicted McCree of capital felony murder but sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole.
- The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal.
- McCree's petition for state postconviction relief was denied.
- McCree filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, arguing the 'death qualification' of his jury was unconstitutional.
- The District Court, relying on social science studies, found that death-qualified juries were 'conviction-prone' and granted habeas relief.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that the practice violated the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment.
- Lockhart, Director of the Arkansas Department of Corrections, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Constitution prohibit the removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Constitution does not prohibit the removal for cause of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would substantially impair their duties at sentencing. First, the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement applies only to jury venires, not to the final petit jury. Even if it did, so-called 'Witherspoon-excludables' do not constitute a 'distinctive group' for fair-cross-section purposes because they are defined by a shared attitude that prevents them from performing a legal duty, not an immutable characteristic like race or gender. Second, the impartiality requirement is satisfied as long as the jury consists of individuals who can conscientiously apply the law and find the facts; it does not require a 'balancing' of different viewpoints. The State of Arkansas has a legitimate interest in using a single jury for both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial, which distinguishes this case from Witherspoon v. Illinois, where the exclusion process served no neutral purpose.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. The Constitution prohibits the 'death qualification' of a jury prior to the guilt phase because this practice produces a tribunal organized to return a verdict of guilty. The respondent presented overwhelming social science evidence demonstrating that death-qualified juries are substantially more likely to convict, and to convict on more serious charges, than juries that include individuals with scruples against capital punishment. The logic of Witherspoon, which held that a state cannot entrust a sentencing decision to a tribunal 'organized to return a verdict of death,' applies with equal force to a guilt determination by a tribunal organized to convict. The majority's attempt to limit Witherspoon and Adams v. Texas to the capital sentencing context is unpersuasive, as the jury's fact-finding role is similar in both phases. The state's asserted interests in efficiency are insufficient to justify this infringement of a defendant's right to an impartial jury, especially when the alternative of using separate juries for guilt and penalty phases is available.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtailed Sixth Amendment challenges to jury composition in capital cases by holding that 'death qualification' is constitutionally permissible. The Court's refusal to extend the fair-cross-section requirement to the petit jury and its narrow definition of a 'distinctive group' solidified the state's power to empanel a single jury for both phases of a capital trial. This ruling prioritizes the state's interests in obtaining a single jury that can follow the law at sentencing over the defendant's concern that such a jury is more prone to convict. As a result, Lockhart v. McCree effectively closed the door on claims that death-qualified juries are unconstitutionally biased in favor of the prosecution during the guilt-innocence phase.
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