Lockhart v. Fretwell
506 U.S. 364 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
To establish "prejudice" under the Sixth Amendment's ineffective assistance of counsel standard, a defendant must show that counsel's errors rendered the trial result fundamentally unfair or unreliable, not merely that the outcome would have been different. An attorney's failure to make an objection based on a legal precedent that is later overruled does not constitute legally cognizable prejudice.
Facts:
- In August 1985, Bobby Ray Fretwell was convicted of capital felony murder for a killing that occurred during a robbery.
- During the sentencing phase, the State argued for the death penalty based on two aggravating factors, one of which was that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
- The jury found the pecuniary gain aggravating factor to exist and, finding no mitigating factors, sentenced Fretwell to death.
- At the time of Fretwell's sentencing, a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit case, Collins v. Lockhart, held that a death sentence was unconstitutional if based on an aggravating factor that duplicated an element of the underlying felony.
- Under Collins, using "pecuniary gain" as an aggravator in a robbery-murder case was unconstitutional "double counting."
- Fretwell's trial counsel failed to object to the use of the pecuniary gain aggravating factor on the basis of the Collins precedent.
Procedural Posture:
- An Arkansas jury convicted Bobby Ray Fretwell of capital felony murder and sentenced him to death.
- Fretwell appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction and sentence, declining to hear the un-objected-to claim.
- Fretwell filed a state habeas corpus petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Arkansas Supreme Court denied.
- Fretwell filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
- The District Court granted habeas relief, finding counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial, and it conditionally vacated the death sentence.
- The State (Lockhart) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of habeas relief.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does an attorney's failure to make an objection that was valid under the law at the time of trial, but which has since been held to be invalid, constitute "prejudice" under the Sixth Amendment's ineffective assistance of counsel standard established in Strickland v. Washington?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. To establish prejudice under Strickland, a defendant must show more than just a different outcome; the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's error rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair or unreliable. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists to ensure a fair trial, not to grant a defendant a windfall based on a legal error. Because the legal principle from Collins v. Lockhart was later overruled and deemed incorrect, Fretwell was never substantively entitled to the benefit of that objection. Therefore, his counsel's failure to raise the now-meritless objection did not deprive him of any substantive right or render the result of his sentencing unreliable or unfair.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No. The prejudice inquiry under Strickland should not consider factors that, as a matter of law, ought not inform the decision, such as the effect of an objection that current governing law holds to be meritless. Just as a defendant has no right to the "luck of a lawless decisionmaker" or the benefit of perjured testimony, a defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice based on the suggestion that a state court might have made an error in his favor by sustaining a legally incorrect objection. Respondent's claim is based on being denied a right the law does not recognize, which is not legally cognizable prejudice.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
No. This opinion joins the Court's reasoning in full but writes separately to correct the Eighth Circuit's fundamental misunderstanding of the Supremacy Clause. The lower court mistakenly assumed that a state trial court is compelled to follow the precedent of the federal court of appeals for its circuit. State courts are only bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of federal law and are not required to follow lower federal court precedents, though they may find them persuasive.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The determination of prejudice under Strickland should be based on the law as it existed at the time of the proceeding, not on hindsight. At the time of sentencing, the Collins objection was valid and there is a reasonable probability it would have changed the outcome from a death sentence to life imprisonment. The majority's retroactive application of a change in law is unjust and inconsistent with the retroactivity principles of Teague v. Lane, which prevent defendants from benefiting from later favorable law changes; fairness dictates the State should not benefit from later unfavorable changes. The lawyer's deficient performance resulted in an invalid death sentence being imposed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly refines the "prejudice" prong of the Strickland test, shifting the focus from a pure outcome-determinative analysis to one centered on fundamental fairness and the reliability of the result. It establishes that a defendant is not prejudiced by counsel's failure to obtain a "windfall" based on a legal rule that is later invalidated. This holding prevents defendants from using federal habeas corpus to benefit from a temporary, and ultimately incorrect, interpretation of the law, thereby strengthening the finality of convictions where the ultimate result is deemed legally correct under current law.
