No, it is not unconstitutional. The government isn't punishing anyone for being religious. It has simply decided not to use taxpayer money to train ministers, which is a historically sensitive topic in America. The scholarship program is still very fair because it allows students to go to religious colleges and even take some religion classes; it just draws the line at paying for a degree to become a minister. This situation falls into a 'gray area' between the Constitution's two rules on religion: 'don't create a state religion' and 'let people practice their religion freely'.

Yes, it is unconstitutional. This is clear discrimination. The state offered a scholarship to everyone who qualifies and then specifically excluded one group: people studying to become ministers. That's treating people differently just because of their religious goals. If the government offers a public benefit, it has to be available to everyone equally. Denying the scholarship is like making religious students pay a special penalty for their faith.

Yes, it is unconstitutional. I agree with Justice Scalia. I'm just writing to add that studying 'theology' doesn't always mean you're studying to be a minister; you can study religion like any other academic subject. But since everyone in this case agreed that Davey's degree was for becoming a minister, Justice Scalia's argument that it's unfair discrimination is correct.

No, it's not against the rules. The state's scholarship program doesn't stop students from being religious or punish them for it. It just doesn't pay for one specific type of religious study. The state has good reasons for this, and it doesn't really hurt the students much. The program doesn't show that the state dislikes religion; it's just being careful about how it spends its money and respecting the balance between religious freedom and not establishing an official religion. I think there's some wiggle room between the rules about protecting religious freedom and not establishing an official religion. In this case, Washington's choice not to pay for degrees in becoming a church leader falls into that wiggle room. The state has a big interest in not funding religious teaching, which we can see from its history and constitution. It's not a huge burden on the students, since they can still use the scholarship for other degrees. The state isn't being mean to religion, just careful. So given the state's big interest and the small burden, not including these degrees is okay.

Yes, it is against the rules. The scholarship program treats religion unfairly by specifically excluding it from a public benefit that everyone else can get. Under the Lukumi case, laws like this have to be looked at very strictly. By singling out religion for exclusion, the state is probably violating the religious freedom rule. The state's interest in not funding religious teaching isn't strong enough to allow this unfair treatment. The state's preference for protecting individual beliefs isn't a good reason to discriminate against religion. The Court's agreement with this preference could be used to exclude religion from almost any public program. The Court doesn't properly defend the program's fairness and instead focuses on how it's not a big burden and wasn't meant to be mean. But neither of those things can excuse outright discrimination against religion.

I agree with Justice Scalia's dissent but want to add that studying theology doesn't always mean religious devotion or faith. The word 'theology' can include non-religious perspectives too. But if we assume the state only denies scholarships for degrees in theology that are about devotion, then I think Justice Scalia's use of previous cases is right.

—holding that Washington State's restriction on the use of a state scholarship to pursue a theological degree did not violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment

In Locke, the Supreme Court rejected a free exercise challenge to a law that barred state scholarship aid from being used for a devotional theology degree.

The Court upheld a Washington State college scholarship program that prohibited the use of scholarship funds for pursuit of a devotional theology degree.

To the Court, this "relatively minor burden" was justified by a "historic and substantial state interest" of not funding "an essentially religious endeavor."

Locke recognized that there is "play in the joints" between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, which means that there is room for some "state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause."

While this case is not a funding case, the Court has most recently held that in such cases there is no significant burden on free exercise rights where, as here, the government has "impose [d] neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite," and where it "does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a …

Recognizing that tension exists between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that "there is room for play in the joints between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to the Establishment …

Because we hold... that the program is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, however, we apply rational-basis scrutiny to [plaintiff's] equal protection claims

Furthermore, any suggestion to the contrary by this Court might run afoul of the other constitutional religion clause.

The Court, however, has long recognized that these two Clauses, while "express [ing] complementary values," "often exert conflicting pressures."

No, a state's exclusion of students pursuing a degree in devotional theology from an otherwise inclusive state scholarship program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. This case falls within the 'play in the joints' between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, where an action may be permitted by the former but not required by the latter. The state's program is not hostile to religion; it does not impose criminal or civil sanctions on religious practice, but merely represents the state's choice not to fund a specific category of instruction—vocational religious training. This decision is supported by a substantial state interest in not using taxpayer funds to support the ministry, an interest with deep historical roots in avoiding religious establishment. Unlike the law in *Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah*, this exclusion is not presumptively unconstitutional because it is not born of animus, and the program is otherwise inclusive, permitting students to attend pervasively religious schools and take devotional courses.

Yes, the state's exclusion violates the Free Exercise Clause. The Washington program is facially discriminatory against religion, as it carves out a solitary course of study—theology—for disfavored treatment. When a state makes a public benefit generally available, it cannot withhold that benefit from individuals solely on the basis of their religion; doing so is no different from imposing a special tax on religious exercise. The majority's reliance on 'play in the joints' is a refusal to apply a principle, as there is no credible Establishment Clause concern that would justify this discrimination. The state's interest is merely a 'pure philosophical preference,' which is not a compelling reason to justify facial discrimination. The indignity of being singled out for special burdens based on one's religious calling constitutes a significant harm, regardless of the monetary amount.

Yes, the state's exclusion violates the Free Exercise Clause. Joining Justice Scalia's dissent, this opinion notes that the term 'theology' is not inherently devotional and can be studied from a secular perspective. However, because both parties agreed to define a 'degree in theology' as one that is 'devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith,' the dissent's reasoning is correct on these facts. The application of the Court's precedents by Justice Scalia correctly resolves the case based on the parties' stipulation.

No. The exclusion of theology degrees from the Promise Scholarship Program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the program does not penalize religious belief, but rather declines to fund a specific category of instruction. The State's interest in not funding religious instruction is substantial, and the burden on students is minor. The State's program does not suggest animus toward religion and is a permissible exercise of the 'play in the joints' between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. I believe that there is room for play in the joints between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, meaning that there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Here, Washington's exclusion of devotional theology degrees from its scholarship program falls into this category. The State has a substantial interest in not funding religious instruction, as supported by the history and text of its constitution. The burden on Promise Scholars is relatively minor, as they may still use their scholarship to pursue a secular degree. The State's disfavor of religion is of a far milder kind than in cases like Lukumi, as it does not impose criminal or civil sanctions on religious practice. Given the State's substantial interest and the relatively minor burden, the scholarship program's exclusion is constitutional.

Yes. The exclusion of theology degrees from the Promise Scholarship Program constitutes a violation of the Free Exercise Clause because it facially discriminates against religion. Under Lukumi, such laws must be subject to the strictest scrutiny. By singling out religion for exclusion from a generally available public benefit, the State is presumptively violating the Free Exercise Clause. The State's interest in not funding religious instruction is not compelling enough to justify this discriminatory treatment. The State's philosophical preference to protect individual conscience is not a valid basis for discriminating against religion. The Court's deference to this interest has no logical limit and could justify excluding religion from virtually any public program. The Court fails to defend the program's neutrality and instead relies on the lightness of the burden and lack of animus, but neither of these factors can excuse facial discrimination against religion.

I join Justice Scalia's dissent but write separately to note that the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith. The term 'theology' itself can encompass secular perspectives. However, assuming that the State denies Promise Scholarships only to students who pursue a degree in devotional theology, I believe Justice Scalia's application of precedent is correct.

Locke v. Davey

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