Liteky et al. v. United States
510 U.S. 540 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge's opinions or biases formed during judicial proceedings do not warrant disqualification unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible, or if they derive from an extrajudicial source.
Facts:
- In 1983, petitioner Bourgeois, a Catholic priest, was tried and convicted by a federal district judge in a bench trial for misdemeanors committed during a protest at the Fort Benning Military Reservation.
- Petitioners alleged that during the 1983 trial, the judge displayed impatience and animosity toward Bourgeois and his beliefs.
- In 1991, Bourgeois and other petitioners were indicted for acts of vandalism, including spilling human blood on government property, also at Fort Benning.
- The 1991 case was assigned to the same district judge who had presided over Bourgeois's 1983 trial.
- The petitioners' actions in the 1991 case were intended as a political protest against United States Government involvement in El Salvador.
Procedural Posture:
- Before trial, petitioners filed a motion in the U.S. District Court to disqualify the judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which the judge denied.
- At the close of the prosecution's case, petitioner Bourgeois renewed the motion for disqualification, which was again denied.
- The petitioners were convicted of the charged offense.
- Petitioners (as appellants) appealed their convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing the judge improperly refused to recuse himself.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that matters arising from judicial proceedings were not a proper basis for recusal.
- The United States Supreme Court granted petitioners' writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Is the 'extrajudicial source' doctrine, which generally requires that a judge's alleged bias stem from a source outside of judicial proceedings, applicable as a factor in determining whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
Yes, the extrajudicial source factor is applicable to motions for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The term 'partiality' in § 455(a), like 'bias' or 'prejudice' in § 455(b)(1), connotes a wrongful or inappropriate disposition; opinions formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in judicial proceedings are not wrongful. The Court reasoned that § 455(a) should be read in harmony with the more specific provisions of § 455(b), which contain the 'extrajudicial source' limitation. However, the doctrine is not a rigid rule but rather a significant factor. An extrajudicial source is not a necessary condition for recusal, as a predisposition developed during a trial may suffice if it is so extreme as to display a 'deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.' Conversely, an extrajudicial source is not a sufficient condition, as some opinions acquired outside of court, like a judge's view of the law, will not suffice.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
Yes, but the majority's analysis is flawed and gives nearly dispositive weight to the source of the alleged partiality. The central inquiry under § 455(a) should be the objective appearance of partiality, regardless of its origin. The majority's standard—that intrajudicial conduct requires disqualification only if it makes fair judgment 'impossible'—is too high and undermines the statute's goal of avoiding even the appearance of partiality. Furthermore, the majority improperly limits the broad, autonomous protections of § 455(a) by tethering them to the specific limitations in § 455(b), contrary to the Court's precedent in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the application of the 'extrajudicial source' doctrine to the modern federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Court transforms the doctrine from a rigid, often-misunderstood rule into a flexible 'factor,' thereby preserving the judge's role in forming opinions during proceedings. By setting an exceptionally high bar for recusal based on in-court conduct ('deep-seated favoritism or antagonism'), the ruling significantly narrows the grounds for such challenges, protecting judges from disqualification based on routine trial management or expressions of irritation. Kennedy's concurrence highlights the tension between this standard and § 455(a)'s broader goal of protecting the public's perception of judicial impartiality, a tension that will likely be debated in future cases.
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