Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital
12 Cal. 4th 291, 907 P.2d 358, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (1995)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An employer is not vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for an employee's intentional tort, such as a sexual assault, if the tort was the result of the employee's independent, personal motivations and was not engendered by, did not arise from, and was not a foreseeable risk of the employment, even if the employment provided the opportunity for the tort to occur.
Facts:
- Lisa M., a 19-year-old pregnant woman, sought treatment at Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital's emergency room after a fall.
- Doctors ordered an ultrasound examination, which was to be performed by technician Bruce Wayne Tripoli.
- Tripoli took Lisa M. to the ultrasound room and refused her request to have her boyfriend accompany her during the procedure.
- Tripoli performed the prescribed obstetrical and upper-right-quadrant examinations, which required physical contact with Lisa M.'s abdomen and chest area.
- After completing the legitimate examinations, Tripoli falsely told Lisa M. that to determine the baby's sex, he needed to scan 'much further down.'
- Under this pretense, Tripoli pulled down Lisa M.'s shorts and sexually molested her with the ultrasound wand and his fingers, claiming he needed to excite her to get a good view of the baby.
- At the time of the misconduct, Lisa M. believed it was an unusual but legitimate part of the medical procedure.
- The following day, Lisa M.'s obstetrician confirmed that Tripoli's actions were improper and not part of a standard ultrasound examination.
Procedural Posture:
- Lisa M. filed a lawsuit against Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital and others in the superior court (trial court).
- The Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was not vicariously liable for Tripoli's actions.
- The superior court granted the Hospital's summary judgment motion.
- Lisa M., as appellant, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment, holding there was a triable issue of fact regarding vicarious liability.
- The Hospital, as petitioner, sought review from the Supreme Court of California, which granted the petition.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, is a hospital vicariously liable for a sexual assault committed by an ultrasound technician on a patient when the assault was motivated by the technician's purely personal reasons and was not an outgrowth of the employment relationship?
Opinions:
Majority - Werdegar, J.
No. A hospital is not vicariously liable for a technician's sexual assault on a patient when the assault was motivated by purely personal reasons and was not an outgrowth of the employment. For respondeat superior to apply to an intentional tort, the tort must be engendered by or arise from the work itself; mere 'but for' causation—that the employment brought the tortfeasor and victim together—is insufficient. Tripoli’s assault was not the result of a work-related dispute or emotion but stemmed from his own 'propinquity and lust.' The assault was not a foreseeable risk of the enterprise because it was not 'so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss' as a cost of business. Unlike the unique, coercive authority of a police officer, a technician's position of trust is limited and does not make a sexual assault a foreseeable misuse of job-created authority.
Dissenting - Mosk, J.
Yes. Whether the sexual assault falls within the scope of employment is a question for the trier of fact. The undisputed facts show that Tripoli's job required him to have intimate physical contact with female patients, including touching their breasts and pubic areas. It is arguable that the sexual urge Tripoli acted upon arose directly from this intimate physical contact that was required by his work. The hospital 'set the stage' for the misconduct, and his inspiration arose from the situation created by the hospital, making the assault a risk of the enterprise for which the employer should be liable.
Dissenting - Kennard, J.
Yes. Summary judgment was improper because whether the employee acted within the scope of employment is a question of fact for the jury. Reasonable minds could differ as to the proper inference to be drawn from the undisputed facts. A jury could reasonably conclude that the intimate physical contact inherent in the ultrasound technician's job, which put the patient in a vulnerable position and allowed the technician to deceive her, created a foreseeable risk that an employee might commit this type of tort. Because the technician's personal motivations were enmeshed with the performance of his duties, the issue should be resolved by a trier of fact, not as a matter of law.
Concurring - George, J.
No. The majority's reasoning and result are correct. I write separately to reiterate my position from a previous case that the court's decision in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, which held a city vicariously liable for a police officer's rape of a detainee, should be overruled.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of respondeat superior for employee sexual assaults, creating a clear distinction between torts that are an 'outgrowth' of employment and those that are purely personal. The court holds that merely providing the time, place, and opportunity for misconduct is insufficient to establish vicarious liability. This ruling establishes a higher bar for plaintiffs, requiring them to demonstrate a direct causal nexus between the employee's job duties or work-related emotions and the intentional tort. It protects employers from becoming strict insurers against personal, aberrant acts of their employees that are unconnected to the nature of the enterprise.
