Linert v. Foutz (Slip Opinion)
149 Ohio St. 3d 469, 75 N.E.3d 1218, 2016 Ohio 8445 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
To establish a manufacturer's post-market duty to warn under R.C. 2307.76(A)(2), a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence for a jury to evaluate not only the seriousness of the harm but also the likelihood of the risk; evidence of a few incidents without contextual data on the total number of products in use is insufficient to create a jury question.
Facts:
- On November 11, 2007, Ross Linert, an on-duty police officer, was driving a 2005 Ford Crown Victoria Police Interceptor (CVPI).
- Linert's vehicle was struck from behind by a car driven by an intoxicated driver, Adrien Foutz, who was traveling at an estimated 90 to 110 miles per hour.
- The high-speed collision caused the CVPI's fuel-sender unit to separate from the fuel tank, which released fuel and ignited a fire that spread into the passenger compartment.
- Linert escaped the vehicle but sustained severe burns to nearly a third of his body, resulting in permanent disability.
- Ford had used the 'Panther-platform' design, with its aft-of-the-axle fuel tank, since 1979.
- Prior to Linert's accident, there had been 34 other rear-impact collisions involving Panther-platform vehicles that resulted in fire, injury, or death; six of these incidents involved the dislodgement of the fuel-sender unit.
- In October 2007, after Linert's police department had purchased the CVPI but before his accident, Ford implemented a 'crimp improvement project' to strengthen the connection of the fuel-sender unit to the tank in response to 'real-world' incidents.
Procedural Posture:
- Ross and Brenda Linert sued Ford Motor Company for product liability in an Ohio trial court.
- At the conclusion of a jury trial, the trial court refused the Linerts’ request for a jury instruction on Ford’s post-market duty to warn.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford on all claims, and the trial court entered judgment for Ford.
- The Linerts, as appellants, appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that the trial court erred by failing to provide the post-market duty-to-warn instruction, and it remanded the case for a new trial on that claim.
- Ford, as appellant, filed a discretionary appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio, which the court accepted for review.
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Issue:
Does a product manufacturer have a post-market duty to warn under Ohio law when a plaintiff presents evidence of a risk of serious harm from several prior incidents, but fails to provide sufficient evidence for a jury to determine the likelihood of that risk?
Opinions:
Majority - O’Connor, C.J.
No. A manufacturer does not have a post-market duty to warn unless the plaintiff provides sufficient evidence for a jury to meaningfully assess the likelihood of the risk, in addition to its seriousness. The court reasoned that the post-market duty to warn under R.C. 2307.76(A)(2) is distinct from the duty at the time of sale and requires knowledge acquired after the sale. The Linerts' evidence of six prior sender-unit failures was insufficient because it was presented without context, such as the total number of CVPIs on the road, which would be necessary to evaluate the actual likelihood of the risk. Without such evidence, a jury would be forced to speculate as to whether a reasonable manufacturer would have issued a warning. The court concluded that speculative risk does not equal the known risk required to trigger a post-market duty to warn.
Dissenting - O’Neill, J.
Yes. The evidence presented was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the post-market duty to warn, and the majority improperly usurped the jury's role as fact-finder. The dissent argued that evidence of 34 similar collisions, six of which were nearly identical to Linert's, combined with Ford's own post-sale project to strengthen the fuel-sender joint, was more than enough evidence for a jury to infer the likelihood of the risk. The majority's attempt to strictly separate pre-sale and post-sale knowledge creates a 'judicial fiction,' as a manufacturer's understanding of a risk evolves over time. The trial court had a duty to give all relevant instructions, and its failure to instruct on the post-market duty to warn prevented the jury from properly weighing the evidence.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs in Ohio bringing post-market failure-to-warn claims. By requiring concrete evidence of the 'likelihood' of a risk, not just its severity, the court raises the bar for getting such claims to a jury. This holding protects manufacturers from liability based on a small number of anecdotal incidents relative to a large volume of products sold. The ruling also reinforces a strict analytical separation between a manufacturer's knowledge before a sale and knowledge acquired after, potentially limiting the scope of evidence plaintiffs can use to establish a post-market duty.
