Lindh v. Murphy
521 U.S. 320 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
When a statute explicitly directs that one of its new chapters applies to pending cases but is silent about the applicability of another new chapter, the negative implication is that the silent chapter does not apply to pending cases. This principle of statutory construction can determine a statute's temporal reach without resorting to judicial default rules on retroactivity.
Facts:
- Aaron Lindh was tried in Wisconsin on multiple charges of murder and attempted murder.
- Lindh raised an insanity defense at his trial.
- The State of Wisconsin called a psychiatrist who had spoken with Lindh shortly after the killings to testify against his defense.
- At the time of trial, this same psychiatrist was under criminal investigation by the State for sexual exploitation of his patients.
- Lindh's attorney attempted to cross-examine the psychiatrist about the state's criminal investigation to suggest a bias in favor of the prosecution.
- The Wisconsin trial court prohibited this line of questioning.
- Lindh was subsequently convicted of the charges.
Procedural Posture:
- Lindh's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in Wisconsin state courts, where he raised a Confrontation Clause claim.
- Lindh filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin on July 9, 1992.
- The District Court denied Lindh's habeas petition in October 1995.
- Lindh, as appellant, appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
- The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the new, stricter standards of the AEDPA did apply to Lindh's pending case and, on that basis, affirmed the denial of his petition.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the AEDPA's amendments to Chapter 153 apply to cases pending at the time of its enactment.
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Issue:
Does the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply its new standards for non-capital habeas corpus petitions (Chapter 153) to cases that were already pending in federal court when the statute was enacted?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Souter
No. The new provisions of AEDPA's Chapter 153 do not apply to non-capital habeas corpus cases that were already pending when the Act became effective. The Court's reasoning is based on the canon of statutory construction 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other). The Act includes Section 107(c), which explicitly states that the new Chapter 154 (governing capital cases) 'shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment.' Congress's silence regarding the application of Chapter 153 amendments to pending cases, when contrasted with its express statement about Chapter 154, creates a strong negative implication that Congress did not intend for Chapter 153 to apply to pending cases. Because this normal rule of construction resolves the question of congressional intent, the Court does not need to apply the judicial default rules against retroactivity established in Landgraf v. USI Film Products.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Yes. The amendments to Chapter 153 should apply to pending cases. The majority's reliance on a negative inference is misplaced, as there are other equally plausible reasons why Congress explicitly mentioned Chapter 154's applicability, such as its conditional nature or a greater concern for expediting capital cases. In the absence of a clear statement from Congress, the Court should have applied the traditional retroactivity principles from Landgraf. Under those principles, the AEDPA's changes are procedural, apply to prospective relief (the writ of habeas corpus), and are jurisdictional in nature. All these factors strongly favor applying the new law to pending cases, consistent with the Court's long-standing precedents.
Analysis:
This decision established a critical threshold for applying the AEDPA, clarifying that its general, stricter habeas provisions do not apply to cases filed before its effective date of April 24, 1996. The case serves as a key example of how courts use traditional canons of statutory interpretation, like negative implication, to determine a statute's temporal scope before engaging in the more complex Landgraf retroactivity analysis. This ruling provided a temporary reprieve for thousands of inmates whose petitions were pending, allowing them to be adjudicated under the older, more petitioner-friendly habeas standards, while cementing the AEDPA's new regime for all future cases.
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