Linda K. Wood v. Steven C. Ostrander Neil Maloney
1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 9271, 1989 WL 68705, 879 F.2d 583 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A state official can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating a person's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights if the official's affirmative conduct, demonstrating deliberate indifference, places the person in a position of danger they would not have otherwise faced.
Facts:
- At 2:30 a.m. on September 23, 1984, Washington State Trooper Steven Ostrander stopped a car driven by Robert Bell, in which Linda Wood was a passenger.
- Ostrander determined Bell was intoxicated and arrested him.
- Ostrander then impounded the car, took the keys, and instructed Wood to get out.
- He left Wood stranded on the roadside in the Parkland area of Pierce County, a district with the highest aggravated crime rate in the county outside the City of Tacoma.
- Wood's home was five miles away, the temperature was fifty degrees, and she was wearing only a blouse and jeans.
- After being turned away by Ostrander and refusing rides from several strangers, Wood accepted a ride from an unknown man.
- The man drove Wood to a secluded area and raped her.
Procedural Posture:
- Linda Wood filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Trooper Ostrander and others in the U.S. District Court.
- The district court initially denied the defendants' first motion for summary judgment.
- Upon a second motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed the case, ruling that Ostrander was entitled to qualified immunity and owed no affirmative constitutional duty of protection to Wood.
- Wood, as the appellant, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a state trooper's action of arresting a driver, impounding the car, and leaving a passenger stranded at night in a known high-crime area violate the passenger's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to personal security, and if so, was this right clearly established such that the trooper is not entitled to qualified immunity?
Opinions:
Majority - David R. Thompson
Yes. A state trooper's action of arresting a driver and abandoning the passenger in a dangerous environment can violate the passenger's substantive due process right to personal security, and this right was clearly established, precluding qualified immunity. The court reasoned that Ostrander's conduct went beyond mere negligence and raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he acted with 'deliberate indifference.' By arresting the driver and impounding the car, Ostrander's affirmative actions created a specific danger for Wood she would not otherwise have faced, distinguishing this from cases where the state merely fails to protect a citizen from a pre-existing danger. This creation of danger triggers a constitutional duty. Regarding qualified immunity, the court found that the law was clearly established by 1984, citing the Seventh Circuit's decision in White v. Rockford, which held police liable for abandoning children on a highway. The court concluded that a reasonable officer should have understood that abandoning a passenger in a foreseeably dangerous situation violates their constitutional rights.
Dissenting - Carroll
No. A state trooper's actions did not violate the passenger's constitutional rights because the state has no affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause to protect individuals from private violence, and even if a right existed, it was not clearly established. The dissent argued that the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago is controlling and establishes that a duty to protect only arises when the state takes a person into its custody, such as through incarceration or institutionalization. Wood was never in state custody, and Ostrander did not create the danger posed by the rapist; he merely left her in a situation where she was exposed to potential dangers from third parties, just like any other member of the public. Therefore, no constitutional duty was triggered. Furthermore, Ostrander is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in 1984. The majority's reliance on White v. Rockford, a single, non-binding case with three separate opinions focusing on minor children, is insufficient to show that a reasonable officer would have known his conduct was unlawful.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational decision for the 'state-created danger' doctrine, which serves as a critical exception to the general rule from DeShaney that the state has no affirmative duty to protect individuals from private harm. The majority opinion establishes that when state actors use their authority to affirmatively create a danger or render an individual more vulnerable to it, they may be held constitutionally liable. This shifts the analysis from a state's failure to act (inaction) to its role in creating peril (affirmative action). The decision has had a significant impact on Section 1983 litigation, providing a pathway for plaintiffs to hold law enforcement and other state officials accountable for conduct that indirectly leads to harm by third parties.
