Lind v. Schenley Industries
278 F.2d 79 (1960)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court abuses its discretion when it grants a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence if the case turns on the credibility of witnesses and the jury's conclusion is not a "seriously erroneous result." A principal is bound by an agent's promise under the doctrine of apparent authority if the principal’s manifestations cause a third party to reasonably believe the agent is authorized to act.
Facts:
- Lind was a long-time employee of Park & Tilford Distiller’s Corp.
- In July 1950, Park & Tilford’s vice-president, Herrfeldt, promoted Lind and directed him to his new superior, Kaufman, to learn his new duties and salary.
- In April 1951, Kaufman sent Lind a letter confirming his title as "District Manager" and stating that an "incentive plan" was being developed for him to "benefit substantially in a monetary way."
- In July 1951, Kaufman orally promised Lind he would receive a 1% commission on the gross sales of the salesmen under his supervision, a promise witnessed by Kaufman's secretary.
- Lind assumed the increased responsibilities of the District Manager position.
- In the autumn of 1952, Herrfeldt, the vice-president, personally assured Lind that he would receive the 1% commission.
- Lind was transferred to a new position as New Jersey State Manager on February 1, 1952, ending the period for which the commission was claimed.
- Park & Tilford never paid Lind the 1% commission for the period he served as District Manager.
Procedural Posture:
- Lind sued Park & Tilford Distiller’s Corp. in the U.S. District Court for breach of an oral contract.
- At the close of all evidence, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied.
- The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Lind, by answering specific interrogatories.
- The trial court molded the verdict and entered a monetary judgment for Lind.
- The defendant then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and, in the alternative, for a new trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).
- The district court granted the defendant's motion for JNOV, setting aside the jury's verdict. It also granted the defendant's alternative motion for a new trial in the event the JNOV was reversed on appeal.
- Lind, as appellant, appealed the district court's judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by setting aside a jury verdict and granting a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, when the case primarily turns on the credibility of witnesses and the subject matter is not complex?
Opinions:
Majority - Biggs, Chief Judge
Yes, a trial court abuses its discretion by granting a new trial when the case is simple, turns on witness credibility, and the jury's verdict is not a seriously erroneous result. The court found that the trial judge improperly substituted his own judgment of the facts and witness credibility for that of the jury. The court's reasoning was that a judge's discretion to grant a new trial is narrow when the ground is that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, as this denigrates the jury's primary function as the trier of fact. The judge's duty is not to re-weigh conflicting evidence but to prevent a "miscarriage of justice" by setting aside only those verdicts that are "quite clear" to be "seriously erroneous." In this case, the jury's main task was to determine the veracity of the witnesses, a function squarely within its province. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of apparent authority, created when the company's vice-president directed Lind to Kaufman for information about his salary, which made it reasonable for Lind to rely on Kaufman’s commission offer.
Dissenting - Hastie, Circuit Judge
No, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion by granting a new trial because the judge is entitled to vacate a verdict that, in his professional judgment, is unjust. The dissent argued that the trial judge's power to grant a new trial when he believes the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is an essential check on the jury system. In this case, there were reasonable grounds for the judge to find the verdict unjust, such as the fact that the alleged commission would have made Lind higher paid than his own superior and that Lind waited a long time before formally demanding payment. The trial judge was not arbitrary in concluding the jury's verdict was unjust, and the majority impinged upon the proper function and discretion of the trial judge by reversing the order for a new trial.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant limitation on a federal trial judge's discretion to grant a new trial under FRCP 50(b). It reinforces the primacy of the jury as the ultimate finder of fact, especially in cases that hinge on witness credibility rather than complex technical issues. By holding that a judge cannot grant a new trial simply because they would have decided the case differently, the decision sets a high standard, requiring a finding that the jury reached a "seriously erroneous result" that constitutes a "miscarriage of justice." This precedent protects the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and clarifies the respective roles of the judge and jury, making it more difficult for judges to substitute their judgment for the jury's on contested factual issues.
