Linafelt v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES-FL., INC.
1999 WL 821095, 745 So.2d 386 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
Under Florida law, an employer has a qualified privilege to disclose job performance information about a former employee to a prospective employer, but this privilege can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the disclosure was knowingly false, deliberately misleading, or made with malicious purpose, potentially supporting claims for defamation or intentional interference with a business relationship.
Facts:
- William A. Linafelt was an exemplary employee of Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., and Beverly Health and Rehabilitative Services, Inc. (appellees) for three years.
- In August 1992, Linafelt worked for a non-continuous eight-hour period, arriving at work before 6:00 a.m., leaving after 10:00 a.m., and returning for another four hours that evening.
- Linafelt submitted a time sheet indicating he had worked continuously from 5:48 a.m. to 2:15 p.m., which did not accurately reflect his non-continuous hours.
- Appellees terminated Linafelt's employment for committing a 'category one' conduct violation by submitting the inaccurate time sheet, despite his good work record, the fact he was not attempting to be paid for more hours than he worked, and a history of loose enforcement of time sheet policies.
- Appellees' policies prohibited re-hiring individuals who committed 'category one' offenses and restricted employees from divulging information about former employees beyond date of hire, position, and date of separation.
- After his termination, Linafelt struggled to find meaningful employment.
- A prospective employer testified that appellees gave Linafelt a negative reference, stating he could never be rehired and was not allowed on the premises due to a 'conduct violation,' but refused to explain the circumstances.
- The employee who gave the reference was aware of appellees' policy limiting disclosures but violated it.
Procedural Posture:
- William A. Linafelt filed suit against Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., and Beverly Health and Rehabilitative Services, Inc. (appellees) in state trial court, claiming breach of an employment contract, defamation, and intentional interference with a business relationship.
- The trial court dismissed Linafelt's breach of contract claim, which was later affirmed by the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District in Linafelt v. Bev, Inc., 662 So.2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
- Prior to the jury trial on the remaining claims of defamation and intentional interference, the trial court excluded evidence of an unemployment commission hearing.
- At the close of Linafelt's case, the trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on Linafelt's claims for punitive damages.
- The trial court initially denied appellees' motion for directed verdict.
- A jury found in favor of Linafelt on both the defamation claim (awarding approximately $370,000) and the intentional interference claim (awarding $600).
- The trial court subsequently granted appellees' motion for judgment in accordance with their motions for directed verdict (formerly judgment notwithstanding the verdict), thereby overturning the jury's verdict and entering judgment for the appellees.
- Linafelt appealed the trial court's entry of judgment for directed verdict and the denial of his motion for a new trial on punitive damages to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
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Issue:
Does a former employer's truthful statement about a past 'conduct violation' that resulted in termination, when given to a prospective employer, constitute defamation, and can it form the basis for a claim of intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship, particularly when the statement is ambiguous and the employer failed to explain the context?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, the former employer's statement did not constitute defamation because it was factually true, but yes, it could form the basis for an intentional interference claim if the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the statements were deliberately misleading or malicious. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the defamation claim because a core element of defamation is a false statement. Although the effect of appellees' statement could be considered defamatory and potentially misleading or malicious, the statement that Linafelt committed a 'conduct violation' by submitting an inaccurate time sheet was, in fact, true. Thus, the defamation claim failed. However, the court reversed the judgment on the tortious interference claim. Despite the technical truthfulness of the 'conduct violation,' there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find the elements of intentional interference with an advantageous business relationship. The jury, however, did not apply the higher 'clear and convincing evidence' standard required by Florida Statute § 768.095 to overcome the employer's qualified privilege. Therefore, a new trial is warranted on this claim to allow the jury to properly determine if the interfering statements were 'knowingly false,' 'deliberately misleading,' or 'rendered with a malicious purpose.' The court also reversed the dismissal of the punitive damages claim as it related to the tortious interference claim. Finally, the court ruled that the trial court erred in excluding evidence from an unemployment commission hearing, finding that while it did not directly prove the falsity of the 'conduct violation,' it was highly probative of the appellees' state of mind (malice or deliberate misleading) when making the negative statements, especially since the employee giving the reference knew the referee found Linafelt's termination unjustified.
Concurring in result - Kahn, J.
Yes, a new trial on liability and damages for the tortious interference claim is warranted. Justice Kahn agreed with the majority that a new trial was necessary due to confusing jury instructions and a problematic verdict form. However, he declined to join the part of the majority's opinion discussing the unemployment commission findings. He cautioned that if the issue of admitting such evidence arises again on remand, the trial court must carefully weigh its probative value against any potential prejudicial impact on the appellees, emphasizing the need to prevent the case from becoming a 'wrongful termination' dispute rather than focusing on the actual claims before the court.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial guidance on the interplay between defamation and tortious interference claims, particularly in the context of employer references. It clarifies that a statement can be factually true, thus defeating a defamation claim, yet still be actionable under tortious interference if it is deliberately misleading or made with malicious intent. The decision underscores the importance of proper jury instructions regarding the 'clear and convincing evidence' standard required to overcome an employer's statutory qualified privilege and broadens the scope of admissible evidence, such as unemployment commission findings, to establish a former employer's state of mind in such disputes. This ruling impacts employers by requiring them to consider not just the factual truth but also the potential for their statements to be deemed misleading or malicious, and provides a pathway for former employees to seek redress even when a technically true statement has damaging effects.
