Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch
2007 WL 4166239, 510 F. 3d 253, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 27390 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
A zoning regulation does not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) Equal Terms provision by excluding religious assemblies while permitting secular ones, provided the religious assemblies are not similarly situated to the permitted secular assemblies with respect to the regulation's stated purpose. A religious assembly is not similarly situated if its presence would cause greater harm to the legitimate, non-discriminatory interests the regulation seeks to advance.
Facts:
- In 1994, Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, a Christian church, purchased property at 162 Broadway in Long Branch, New Jersey.
- The property was located in a C-1 Central Commercial District, where the city's Ordinance (20-6.13) permitted uses like assembly halls, theaters, and restaurants, but did not list churches as a permitted use.
- Between 1995 and 2000, Long Branch denied Lighthouse's applications to use the property as a church and for other related functions.
- In 2002, Long Branch adopted a new Redevelopment Plan for the area which superseded the old Ordinance.
- The Plan's stated goals were economic redevelopment and creating a vibrant "Regional Entertainment / Commercial" district.
- The Plan permitted uses like theaters, cinemas, restaurants, and bars but expressly prohibited any unlisted uses, which included churches.
- Long Branch justified the exclusion of churches by citing a New Jersey law that restricts the issuance of liquor licenses within 200 feet of a house of worship, which it claimed would undermine the Plan's entertainment-focused goals.
- In 2003, Lighthouse submitted an application for its property under the new Plan, which Long Branch also denied.
Procedural Posture:
- In June 2000, Lighthouse filed suit against the City of Long Branch in a New Jersey state trial court.
- Long Branch removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.
- After Congress passed RLUIPA, Lighthouse amended its complaint to add claims that the city's Ordinance violated the statute's 'Equal Terms' provision.
- The district court denied Lighthouse's motion for a preliminary injunction, a decision which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in a nonprecedential opinion (Lighthouse I).
- After the case was remanded, Lighthouse filed another amended complaint to challenge the city's new Redevelopment Plan under RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause.
- The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Long Branch on all claims, holding that Lighthouse had not identified a similarly situated secular comparator and that the regulations were neutral laws of general applicability.
- Lighthouse, as appellant, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with the City of Long Branch as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a zoning ordinance that excludes religious assemblies from a district where secular assemblies are permitted violate the Equal Terms provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) if the religious assembly is not "similarly situated" to the permitted secular assemblies regarding the ordinance's regulatory purpose?
Opinions:
Majority - Roth, Circuit Judge
No. A zoning ordinance that treats a religious assembly less favorably than a secular one does not violate RLUIPA's Equal Terms provision if the two are not similarly situated with respect to the regulation's purpose. The core analysis requires comparing the religious use to a secular use in light of the regulation's stated objectives to determine if the religious use would be more harmful. For the old Ordinance, Long Branch failed to articulate a regulatory purpose that a church would harm more than a permitted 'assembly hall,' thus violating RLUIPA. In contrast, the new Redevelopment Plan is valid because its stated goal is to create an entertainment district with restaurants and bars. A New Jersey statute restricting liquor licenses near churches means a church is not similarly situated to a theater or restaurant, as it would uniquely undermine this specific, legitimate governmental goal.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Jordan, Circuit Judge
Yes, such an ordinance violates RLUIPA's plain text whenever it categorically excludes religious assemblies from a zone where secular assemblies are permitted. The majority's 'similarly situated as to regulatory purpose' test is an improper judicial invention not found in the statute that frustrates Congress's intent to protect religious land use. The statute's text is straightforward: if secular assemblies are allowed, religious assemblies must be too. Both the old Ordinance and the new Redevelopment Plan facially violate RLUIPA's 'Equal Terms' provision because they prohibit churches while allowing secular assemblies like theaters and halls.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the 'similarly situated as to regulatory purpose' test for RLUIPA Equal Terms claims in the Third Circuit, creating a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit's more textualist approach. The ruling provides municipalities a defense against such claims if they can articulate a clear, non-discriminatory regulatory purpose that a religious institution would uniquely undermine. This framework increases the burden on religious plaintiffs, who must now engage with the municipality's stated land-use objectives rather than simply pointing to any instance of unequal treatment between religious and secular assemblies.
