Lifson v. City of Syracuse
958 N.E.2d 72, 17 N.Y.3d 492 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
An event that is a common, foreseeable, and natural occurrence, such as sun glare while driving westbound at sunset, does not constitute a 'sudden and unexpected' circumstance that would warrant a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine.
Facts:
- Derek Klink and Irene Lifson both worked at the MONY Plaza in Syracuse.
- Many employees, including Lifson, regularly crossed Harrison Street between the office towers and a parking garage at a location without a marked crosswalk.
- On February 29, 2000, at approximately 4:05 p.m., Klink was making a left-hand turn to drive west onto Harrison Street.
- Klink, though he worked in the area, was not familiar with this particular driving route.
- While making the turn, Klink testified he was suddenly blinded by sun glare.
- His immediate reaction was to look down and away; when he looked back up, he saw Lifson for the first time, a fraction of a second before impact.
- Klink's car struck and killed Lifson, who was wearing a red coat.
- There was no evidence that Lifson darted into the street or that Klink was speeding.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff, representing the estate of Irene Lifson, sued defendant Derek Klink for negligence in the New York Supreme Court, the trial court of first instance.
- At the conclusion of the trial, the court granted Klink's request for a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine over the plaintiff's objection.
- The jury returned a verdict finding Klink not negligent.
- Plaintiff appealed the judgment in favor of Klink to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the emergency instruction was properly given.
- The plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a driver's temporary blindness from sun glare, experienced while driving westbound near sunset, constitute a qualifying emergency that entitles the driver to a jury instruction on the emergency doctrine?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Judge Lippman
No. A driver's temporary blindness from sun glare under these circumstances does not constitute a qualifying emergency. The emergency doctrine applies only when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance not of their own making. It is a well-known and foreseeable phenomenon that the sun can interfere with vision when it is low on the horizon, particularly for a driver heading west. Because Klink was turning west around sunset, the sun glare was not an 'unexpected' event. This situation is analogous to facing icy roads in freezing weather, which this court has previously held is not a qualifying emergency. Therefore, providing the jury with an emergency instruction was a harmful error that may have affected the verdict.
Dissenting - Judge Smith
Yes. A jury could reasonably find that the sun glare constituted a qualifying emergency. The core of the emergency doctrine is not whether an event is foreseeable in general, but whether it was 'sudden and unexpected' to the driver at the specific moment it occurred. Even the best drivers can be surprised by the sudden, blinding effect of sun glare, as they cannot be expected to constantly calculate the sun's position relative to their direction, time, and surroundings. The driver's general awareness of a potential hazard, such as a child near a park or a car making an illegal turn, has not precluded the emergency charge in past cases. The majority's holding improperly equates the general foreseeability of sunset with the specific, unexpected experience of being blinded.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the application of the common-law emergency doctrine in New York, particularly in cases involving common environmental or weather conditions. By holding that foreseeable natural phenomena like sun glare at sunset do not qualify as emergencies, the court places a higher duty on drivers to anticipate and mitigate such predictable hazards. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants in negligence cases to use the emergency doctrine as a shield when accidents result from common driving challenges. The ruling reinforces a shift away from the doctrine, which the court notes has been eroded by the adoption of comparative negligence principles.
