Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State

Majority - PER CURIAM

No, the 1995 Wis. Act 56 (the Stadium Act) does not violate the Wisconsin Constitution on any of the asserted grounds. The court presumes the Act is constitutional and upholds it because it does not constitute a special or private tax law, permits only public purpose expenditures without creating state debt, does not involve unconstitutional internal improvements, adheres to municipal debt limitations, and does not pledge the state's credit. First, concerning the claim that the Act is a special or private tax law in violation of Wis. Const. art. IV, §§ 31 and 32, the court applied the five-part `City of Brookfield` test for general laws. It found the population-based classification for districts to be based on substantial distinctions, germane to the law's purpose (supporting major league baseball and economic development), open to other counties meeting the criteria, equally applicable to all class members, and reflective of true differences justifying different legislation. The court also clarified that tax exemptions were for the District and its bonds, not specifically for the Brewers, and were consistent with how other local government entities are treated. Second, regarding the claim of contracting state debt without a public purpose under Wis. Const. art. VIII, §§ 4 and 7(2), the court affirmed that the legislature's express declaration of public purpose—encouraging economic development, tourism, reducing unemployment, and bringing capital into the state—is given great weight and is valid. The court emphasized that the concept of public purpose is fluid and distinguished between the game of baseball itself and the legislation's broader public purpose, noting that incidental private benefit does not negate the predominant public purpose, citing `State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak` and `State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter`. Third, addressing the internal improvements clause of Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 10, the court concluded that the stadium is not an unconstitutional internal improvement because its construction is incident to a predominantly governmental purpose. The court cited precedents like `Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Auth. v. Earl` and `State ex rel. Hammann v. Levitan`, stating that promoting economic activity, recreation, and reducing unemployment are predominant governmental purposes, and that what constitutes a governmental function varies with time. Fourth, concerning the municipal debt limitation of Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(3), the court held that the District's bonds do not create an "indebtedness" within the constitutional meaning. This is because the bonds are payable solely from a special fund generated by sales and use taxes, not general property taxes, and do not pledge the full faith and credit of the District or the counties. This structure aligns with the "special fund doctrine" and is analogous to special assessment bonds, as discussed in `City of Hartford v. Kirley`. Furthermore, the court recognized baseball park facilities as "public utilities" for financing purposes under Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(5), meaning debt secured solely by their property or income does not count as municipal indebtedness. Finally, as to the pledge of state credit in violation of Wis. Const. art. VIII, § 3, the court rejected three arguments. It found that state grants or subsidies do not inherently implicate the credit clause. It also determined that the local professional baseball district is a separate legal entity from the state, possessing its own powers like suing and levying sales taxes, consistent with `Redevelopment Authority v. Canepa` and `Warren v. Nusbaum`. Most importantly, the "moral obligation" pledge within the Act was held not to create a legally enforceable obligation on the state. Citing `State ex rel. Wisconsin Dev. Authority v. Dammann` and `Nusbaum`, the court reiterated that only a legally enforceable obligation constitutes a forbidden pledge of state credit, and the moral obligation merely expresses a legislative aspiration.