Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The 'all-or-nothing' doctrine of contributory negligence is superseded by a system of 'pure' comparative negligence, under which liability is assessed in direct proportion to fault and a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault but not barred.
Facts:
- Nga Li was driving her Oldsmobile northbound on Alvarado Street in Los Angeles.
- Approximately 70 feet before the intersection with Third Street, Li began a left turn across three southbound lanes, intending to enter a service station driveway.
- At the same time, Robert Phillips, an employee of Yellow Cab Company, was driving a taxicab southbound in the middle lane of Alvarado Street.
- Phillips' taxicab came over the crest of a hill, proceeded through the intersection, and collided with the right rear portion of Li's automobile.
- The collision resulted in personal injuries to Li and damage to her car.
Procedural Posture:
- Nga Li (plaintiff) filed a lawsuit against Robert Phillips and Yellow Cab Company (defendants) in a California trial court.
- The case was tried before a judge sitting without a jury.
- The trial court found that both defendant Phillips and plaintiff Li were negligent and that the negligence of each was a proximate cause of the collision.
- Applying the doctrine of contributory negligence, the trial court concluded that Li's own negligence barred her from any recovery.
- The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants.
- Nga Li appealed the trial court's judgment.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Should the judicially-created 'all-or-nothing' doctrine of contributory negligence be superseded by a judicially-adopted system of 'pure' comparative negligence, which assesses liability in proportion to fault?
Opinions:
Majority - Sullivan, J.
Yes. The 'all-or-nothing' doctrine of contributory negligence should be superseded by a system of 'pure' comparative negligence. The contributory negligence doctrine is inequitable because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault, which is the foundational principle of tort liability. The court is not precluded from acting by Civil Code section 1714, as the legislature intended that statute to be a continuation of the common law, subject to judicial evolution, not a permanent codification of the 1872 rule. Practical difficulties in administering a comparative system, such as those involving multiple parties, are not insurmountable and should not prevent this necessary reform. The court adopts the 'pure' form of comparative negligence—whereby a plaintiff can recover even if more than 50% at fault—because it is the most logical and just system that avoids the arbitrary cutoff of the '50 percent' rule. Consequently, the doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk (as a variant of contributory negligence) are abolished and subsumed into the general assessment of liability in proportion to fault.
Dissenting - Clark, J.
No. The court should not replace contributory negligence with comparative negligence through judicial action. For over a century, California courts have uniformly held that Civil Code section 1714 codified the doctrine of contributory negligence. By judicially amending the statute's clear meaning and original legislative intent, the majority usurps the constitutional power of the Legislature. Such a significant policy change, with numerous competing systems to evaluate, is best handled by the Legislature, which possesses the investigatory resources to fairly appraise the complex social and economic consequences, a task for which the judiciary is ill-equipped. This decision is an act of 'judicial chauvinism' that departs from established principles of statutory construction and separation of powers.
Concurring - Mosk, J.
Yes. While concurring in the judgment and the adoption of comparative negligence, this opinion is written to address the majority's application of the new rule. The decision to apply the new rule to the litigant who brought the case, Nga Li, is correct as it provides an incentive for parties to challenge outdated legal doctrines. However, this welcome result effectively overrules a line of recent cases, most notably Westbrook v. Mihaly, where the court refused to grant the benefits of a new rule to the victorious party. The majority's failure to forthrightly acknowledge that it is overruling this precedent diminishes the opinion's clarity and forthrightness, even though the court has finally settled on the correct and just method for applying a new court-made rule.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally altered California tort law by replacing the harsh, all-or-nothing contributory negligence rule with a more equitable system of pure comparative negligence. The case is significant for demonstrating the judiciary's power to evolve common law doctrines, even when those principles have been codified in statute, by interpreting the statute as a flexible continuation of common law rather than a rigid command. Li v. Yellow Cab established a new framework for fault allocation that has since been applied to complex scenarios involving multiple tortfeasors and strict liability. It set a powerful precedent for judicial law reform, influencing other jurisdictions to reconsider long-standing but unjust legal doctrines.
Unlock the full brief for Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California