Lewis v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
487 N.E.2d 1071, 139 Ill. App. 3d 634, 94 Ill. Dec. 194 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
To state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the zone of physical danger test, a plaintiff must have been in such proximity to an accident that there was a high risk of physical impact, causing a reasonable fear for one's own safety. Being trapped in a stalled elevator, without more, does not satisfy this standard as a matter of law.
Facts:
- Lucille Lewis was a resident of an apartment building owned by the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA).
- Westinghouse Elevator Co. was responsible for maintaining and servicing the elevators in the building.
- On August 16, 1983, Lewis took an elevator from the first floor to the 16th floor.
- Upon reaching the 16th floor, the elevator stalled and the doors failed to open, trapping Lewis inside.
- Lewis remained trapped in the elevator for approximately 40 minutes.
- During this time, Lewis feared she was in danger of "suffocation and serious physical harm."
- As a result of the incident, Lewis alleged she suffered an unstable angina and an aggravation of her pre-existing coronary arteriosclerotic heart disease and hypertension.
Procedural Posture:
- Lucille Lewis filed a three-count amended complaint against Westinghouse Elevator Co. and the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) in the trial court.
- The third count of the complaint alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the third count for failure to state a cause of action.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the count.
- The plaintiff, Lewis, as appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Illinois Appellate Court.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who was trapped in a stalled elevator for 40 minutes, causing fear of suffocation and aggravation of a pre-existing heart condition, state a valid cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the zone of physical danger test?
Opinions:
Majority - Presiding Justice Jiganti
No. The plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because being trapped in a stalled elevator does not place a person within a zone of physical danger. To recover under the zone of physical danger test established in Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, a plaintiff must show they were in such proximity to an accident that there was a 'high risk of physical impact' which caused a 'reasonable fear for his own safety.' Here, the elevator merely stalled; there was no outside force present that created a high risk of physical impact. Furthermore, the court found that the fear of suffocation was not reasonable for a person of ordinary sensibilities in this situation. The court concluded that determining whether a fear is reasonable and whether a high risk of impact exists are questions of law for a judge to decide at the pleading stage to prevent litigation over 'trivial hurts.'
Dissenting - Justice Linn
Yes. The plaintiff's complaint alleges a valid cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress that should be permitted to proceed to a jury. The majority misinterprets the Rickey test by applying the 'high risk of physical impact' standard, which was intended for bystanders, to a direct victim. As a direct victim trapped inside the malfunctioning elevator, Lewis was, by definition, at the nucleus of the zone of danger. Moreover, the majority improperly dismisses Lewis's fear of 'serious physical harm,' not just suffocation, which is not unreasonable as a matter of law given that a mechanical malfunction could worsen. The determination of whether a plaintiff's fear is reasonable and whether they are a 'person of ordinary sensibilities' are questions of fact for a jury, not questions of law for a court to decide on a motion to dismiss.
Analysis:
This decision significantly shapes the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress by empowering trial courts to act as gatekeepers. By classifying the questions of 'reasonable fear' and 'high risk of physical impact' as matters of law rather than fact, the court allows for the dismissal of claims at the pleading stage. This precedent narrows the application of the 'zone of physical danger' test, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring claims based on emotionally distressing events that do not involve an obvious, immediate threat of physical impact, even if they result in tangible physical harm.
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