James T. Lewis v. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County
82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 970 P.2d 872, 19 Cal. 4th 1232 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
An appellate court is not required by statute or the California Constitution to provide parties with an opportunity for oral argument before issuing a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance, a procedure reserved for exceptional cases where the petitioner's entitlement to relief is obvious or there is a compelling temporal urgency.
Facts:
- Chester Green was riding his horse on a dirt road owned by James T. Lewis.
- The road was the only means of access to the Greens' property.
- Green's horse stumbled in a rut on the road, causing Green to fall and sustain personal injuries.
- Chester Green and his wife, Robin Green, sued Lewis for negligence, alleging he failed to maintain the road in a safe condition.
- Lewis asserted that the claim was barred by a recreational use immunity statute, which protects landowners from liability for injuries sustained by people using the land for recreation, such as animal riding.
- The Greens countered that Chester Green was not using the road for a recreational purpose, but was merely using it as the sole access route to reach his own property.
Procedural Posture:
- Chester and Robin Green sued James T. Lewis for negligence in the superior court (trial court).
- Lewis moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the recreational use immunity statute.
- The superior court denied Lewis's motion for summary judgment, finding a triable issue of fact existed.
- Lewis filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, asking it to overturn the superior court's denial.
- The Court of Appeal invited the Greens to file opposition and notified the parties it was considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance.
- The Greens filed an opposition brief which included a specific request for oral argument if the court decided to grant the writ.
- Without holding oral argument, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate, ordering the superior court to grant summary judgment in favor of Lewis.
- The Greens' petition for rehearing at the Court of Appeal was denied.
- The Greens then petitioned for review to the California Supreme Court, which granted the petition on two limited issues.
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Issue:
Does an appellate court have a constitutional or statutory obligation to provide parties an opportunity for oral argument before issuing a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance?
Opinions:
Majority - George, C. J.
No. An appellate court is not constitutionally or statutorily required to hold oral argument before issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance. The statutes requiring a case to be "heard" do not necessarily mandate an oral hearing; in this context, they merely require the court to consider the written petition and not grant it by default. The California Constitution's requirement that a specified number of justices be "present at the argument" for a judgment only applies if oral argument is held; it does not independently create a right to oral argument in all causes. This accelerated procedure is an exception, appropriate only when a petitioner's right to relief is obvious under settled law and undisputed facts, or when an unusual urgency exists, making oral argument superfluous or impractical.
Concurrence - Baxter, J.
No. The statutory authority for courts to issue peremptory writs in the first instance has existed since before the adoption of the relevant constitutional provisions. The historical context and legislative debates surrounding the constitutional language about justices being present at "argument" show no intent to curtail this pre-existing, long-standing judicial power. This procedure is crucial for compelling immediate action from various officials and boards where delay would be harmful, and was never intended to be limited by a mandatory oral argument requirement.
Dissenting - Kennard, J.
Yes. Both the Code of Civil Procedure and the California Constitution guarantee a right to oral argument before a final judgment. Code of Civil Procedure section 1088, which states a case "must be heard," is best interpreted as requiring an oral hearing, consistent with its use in related statutes. More importantly, this court's precedents in People v. Brigham and Moles v. Regents of University of California have already established that the Constitution's requirement for judges to be "present at the argument" creates a right to oral argument before any judgment, which includes a peremptory writ. It is anomalous to grant a right to oral argument to a party who loses at trial and appeals, but deny it to a party who wins at trial but faces reversal by writ.
Dissenting - Brown, J.
Yes. The majority's conclusion defies simple logic and established precedent. This court has already held in Brigham and Moles that the state Constitution provides a right to oral argument before a "judgment." The majority concedes that a peremptory writ issued in the first instance is a "judgment." Therefore, the right to oral argument must apply. The majority's attempt to distinguish this case by claiming the precedents did not rely solely on the Constitution is a tortured and novel approach that undermines stare decisis. This creates an arbitrary distinction that favors parties who lose in the trial court over those who win.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the right to oral argument in appellate writ proceedings, carving out a significant exception for peremptory writs issued in the first instance under the Palma procedure. It solidifies the idea that this accelerated process is a true exception to normal appellate practice, dispensing with oral argument as well as full briefing. The holding places a strong cautionary burden on appellate courts to use this procedure only in the narrowest of circumstances—truly obvious error or extreme urgency—as it denies a litigant the valued opportunity for direct dialogue with the court. Future legal challenges will likely focus not on the right to oral argument itself, but on whether a court's use of the accelerated Palma procedure was substantively justified in a particular case.
