Lewis v. Searles
452 S.W.2d 153 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
A devise of property to a person 'so long as she remains single and unmarried,' with a provision for division of the property only in the event of marriage and no gift over upon death, creates a determinable fee simple estate, not a life estate.
Facts:
- Letitia G. Lewis owned a parcel of real estate in New Madrid County, Missouri.
- On May 31, 1911, Letitia G. Lewis executed a will.
- The will devised all her real and personal property to her niece, Hattie L. Lewis, 'so long as she remains single and unmarried.'
- The will further stated that in the event Hattie L. Lewis were to marry, the property would be divided equally, with one-third to Hattie L. Lewis, one-third to another niece, Letitia A. LaForge, and one-third to a nephew, James R. Lewis.
- Letitia G. Lewis died on September 27, 1926, and her will was probated.
- Since the death of the testatrix, Hattie L. Lewis has been in continuous possession of the real estate.
- Hattie L. Lewis has never married.
Procedural Posture:
- Hattie L. Lewis filed a declaratory judgment suit in a Missouri trial court, seeking to quiet title to certain real estate in her name in fee simple.
- The descendants of her deceased nephew, James R. Lewis, filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting that Lewis held only a life estate.
- The trial court entered a judgment finding that Lewis was the owner of a life estate in the property, and also the owner of an undivided one-third interest in fee simple, subject to her own life estate.
- Lewis's motion for a new trial was overruled by the trial court.
- Lewis, as plaintiff-appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
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Issue:
Does a devise of real property to a niece 'so long as she remains single and unmarried,' with a provision that upon her marriage the property be divided into thirds among her and two other relatives, create a determinable fee simple?
Opinions:
Majority - Henry I. Eager
Yes, the devise creates a determinable fee simple. First, the court found the condition restraining marriage was valid, not as a penalty, but as a reasonable provision for the niece's support while she remained single. Second, and more critically, the court determined the estate created was a determinable fee, not a life estate. The court reasoned that the testatrix's intent, derived from the will as a whole, was to deal in fee interests, as evidenced by the fact that Hattie would retain one-third in fee upon marriage. Furthermore, the will contained no gift over upon Hattie's death, and interpreting the estate as a life estate could lead to partial intestacy, which is disfavored. The court relied heavily on a Missouri statute (§ 474.480) which mandates that a devise is presumed to be a fee simple unless the will expressly limits it to a life estate or makes a further devise to take effect after the death of the devisee. The court distinguished this case from prior precedent like Winget v. Gay, which had found a life estate in similar circumstances, by focusing on the specific terms of this will and the guidance of the statute.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant clarification in Missouri's property law concerning the interpretation of wills with conditions related to marriage. It signals a shift away from the precedent set by cases like Winget v. Gay, which tended to interpret such devises as creating life estates. By emphasizing the state statute favoring fee simple interpretations (§ 474.480) and focusing on the lack of a gift over upon death, the court established a stronger presumption in favor of a determinable fee. This ruling provides clearer guidance for estate planners and will likely lead future courts to find a determinable fee unless the testator's intent to create only a life estate is explicitly and unambiguously stated.
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