Lewis v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.
119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 10, 65 P.3d 245, 119 Nev. 100 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
In a products liability action, an adequate warning must (1) be designed to reasonably catch the consumer's attention, (2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of the specific risks involved with the product, and (3) be of an intensity justified by the magnitude of the risk.
Facts:
- In May 1991, Leo Gasse and a partner purchased a used Sea Ray pleasure boat, which was equipped with a gasoline generator to power accessories like the air conditioner.
- The boat was sold with warnings from the generator manufacturer and a marine association that primarily addressed the danger of carbon monoxide from engine exhaust.
- Dealership staff also verbally warned the purchasers about carbon monoxide from engine exhaust and the need for ventilation when running the main propulsion engines.
- On May 29, 1993, while on Lake Mead, Gasse and Robin Lewis went to sleep in the boat's cabin with the gasoline generator running to power the air conditioner.
- The next morning, Gasse was found dead and Lewis was found catastrophically injured due to carbon monoxide poisoning.
- An investigation determined that the source of the odorless carbon monoxide was the generator, not the engines, as fumes had likely been blown back into the cabin by wind—a phenomenon known as 'migrating carbon monoxide'.
Procedural Posture:
- Robin Lewis and the heirs of Leo Gasse (appellants) sued Sea Ray Boats, Inc. (appellee) in a Nevada district court (trial court), alleging strict products liability.
- At the conclusion of the trial, the plaintiffs proposed a specific jury instruction defining an 'adequate warning,' which the court rejected.
- The court provided the jury with two general instructions on the issue of warnings.
- During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge requesting a definition of 'adequate warning,' but the court refused to provide a more specific instruction and reread the original ones.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Sea Ray Boats, Inc.
- The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to provide a specific, multi-factor jury instruction defining an 'adequate warning' in a products liability case, and instead giving only general instructions for the jury to use its common sense?
Opinions:
Majority - Maupin, L.
Yes. A trial court's refusal to give a specific, properly requested jury instruction on an important point of law, such as the definition of an 'adequate warning,' is a reversible error. The court held that a party is entitled to have the jury instructed on its specific theory of the case. The general instructions provided—telling the jury to use 'common sense' and consider the 'impression' on the average user—were insufficient to guide the jury on the central issue of whether the warnings adequately communicated the specific risk of odorless carbon monoxide from the generator, as distinct from engine exhaust. The jury's explicit request for a definition of 'adequate warning' underscored the insufficiency of the instructions given. The court formally adopted the three-part 'Pavlides' test, requiring warnings to be attention-getting, comprehensible about specific risks, and intense enough for the level of danger.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a clear, mandatory standard for what constitutes an 'adequate warning' in Nevada products liability law, formally adopting the well-regarded 'Pavlides' test. It moves beyond a vague 'common sense' standard for juries, requiring trial courts to provide specific legal guidance on this critical element of failure-to-warn claims. This holding increases the burden on manufacturers to provide clear, specific, and intense warnings proportional to the risk and gives plaintiffs a more concrete legal standard to argue at trial. The case significantly clarifies jury instruction requirements, making it more difficult for trial courts to rely on vague, 'stock' instructions for complex legal issues.
