Lewellin Ex Rel. Heirs of Lewellin v. Huber
1991 WL 5016, 465 N.W.2d 62, 1991 Minn. LEXIS 20 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under Minnesota's dog owner's liability statute, which imposes absolute liability, the phrase "attacks or injures" requires direct and immediate legal causation between the dog's action and the injury, without attenuated intermediate links.
Facts:
- Susan and Randy Huber owned a 6-month-old Golden Retriever.
- The Hubers arranged for 16-year-old Tonia Stomberg to house-sit and care for their dog while they were on vacation.
- On July 6, 1987, Tonia was driving her automobile with the dog in the back seat.
- The dog attempted to move from the back seat to the front by climbing between the bucket seats, putting its head in Tonia's face and "bugging" her.
- Tonia was distracted while attempting to settle the dog, causing her car to go off the road.
- The car ran over and killed 9-year-old Chazdon Lewellin, who was lying in the ditch.
- The dog had a tendency to be "frisky" but had never attacked or bitten anyone, nor demonstrated vicious propensities.
- Mr. Huber had previously restrained the dog in the back seat with a seat belt, a practice Tonia was unaware of.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff trustee for the heirs of Chazdon Lewellin sued the defendant dog owners for violation of the dog owner's liability statute.
- The case was presented to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts.
- The trial court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages against the defendant dog owners under the dog owner's liability statute.
- The court of appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the application of the statute but reversed and remanded for trial because "a genuine issue of material fact exists as to intervening negligence of the driver."
- Defendants (Hubers) petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for further review, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does Minnesota's dog owner's liability statute, which imposes absolute liability for a dog's "attacks or injures" any person, apply when a dog's non-hostile behavior sets in motion an attenuated chain of events leading to injury, or does it require direct and immediate causation?
Opinions:
Majority - Simonett, Justice
No, Minnesota's dog owner's liability statute does not apply when a dog's non-hostile behavior sets in motion an attenuated chain of events leading to injury; it requires direct and immediate causation. The court held that the phrase "attacks or injures" in Minn.Stat. § 347.22, which imposes absolute liability, must be interpreted to require direct and immediate legal causation, without intermediate linkage. This interpretation aligns with the statutory context, which creates absolute liability for certain dog actions. The term "attacks" implies aggressive, violent intent, while "injures" in tandem means affirmative but non-attacking behavior that directly and immediately implicates the injured person (e.g., a dog running into someone). The court referenced its prior decision in Seim v. Garavalia, noting that recovery is "insured in all cases" when the statute's elements are met, implying that proximate cause is not a problem because the statutory phrase contemplates direct action. Legislative history, including discussions about protecting people from "attacks and immediate harm from dogs" and eliminating the "one free bite" rule, supports this narrow interpretation. Expanding absolute liability to cover attenuated causal chains would go beyond the statute's intended purpose, especially since common law negligence actions already exist for broader causation. In this case, the dog's conduct was directed at the driver, and the driver's subsequent efforts to manage the distraction introduced an intermediate link, making the chain of events too attenuated to constitute legal causation for the "radical kind of liability" imposed by the statute.
Dissenting - Yetka, Justice
Yes, the dog owner's liability statute should apply to this case, and the question of proximate cause between the dog's actions and the injury should be a factual determination for a jury. Justice Yetka argued that a plain reading of the statute, which uses "attacks or injures," indicates that liability is not limited solely to dog-bite cases, even if legislative history shows primary concern for them. The word "or" suggests two distinct scenarios for liability. The dissent cited similar statutes in other states (Illinois and Wisconsin) where courts have interpreted "injures" more broadly to include non-aggressive actions that proximately cause injury, and have left the determination of proximate cause to a jury. Specifically, Illinois courts interpret their similar statute to cover actions that are "in themselves harmless but which, under a particular set of facts, results in injury," and consider causation a jury question. The Wisconsin courts, with a statute imposing liability for "injuring or causing injury," have held owners liable for non-aggressive actions (e.g., dog running under a tractor, dog darting onto a road causing a car to crash), even noting that "harshness of result in certain extreme situations is a social price sometimes paid for the perceived benefits of the strict liability policy." Furthermore, the dissent highlighted that the Hubers knew of the dog's habit of trying to get into the front seat, which could strengthen the case for liability.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrows the scope of Minnesota's dog owner's liability statute, emphasizing that its absolute liability only applies to injuries directly and immediately caused by a dog's actions, whether hostile or non-hostile. It underscores a judicial reluctance to expand strict liability beyond its clearly intended purpose, especially when a common law negligence action provides an alternative remedy for more attenuated causal chains. The decision provides clarity on "legal causation" in statutory strict liability contexts, distinguishing it from mere "causation in fact," and may limit future claims under the statute to instances involving direct contact or very close proximity between the dog's action and the injury.
