Levey v. DeNardo
555 Pa. 514, 725 A.2d 733, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 484 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
A trailing driver is entitled to a sudden emergency doctrine jury instruction if there is insufficient evidence to unequivocally establish their negligence in violating the assured clear distance ahead rule, particularly when a sudden and unexpected peril is created by a third party.
Facts:
- On December 20, 1990, Appellee Levey was driving south on Wallingford Road in Delaware County.
- Appellant Roland DeNardo was driving south on Wallingford Road, behind Levey.
- The speed limit on Wallingford Road was 25 m.p.h., and the road surface was wet.
- As both Levey and DeNardo rounded a downhill curve, they observed Appellee Manley, who was traveling toward them in the opposite lane, stop his vehicle.
- Manley suddenly, and without warning, turned left directly into the path of Levey's vehicle.
- Levey applied her brakes but collided with Manley's vehicle.
- DeNardo applied his brakes, but his vehicle skidded on the wet road surface and impacted Levey’s vehicle, then Manley’s vehicle.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellee Levey initiated a lawsuit against both Appellee Manley and Appellant Roland DeNardo in a trial court (Court of Common Pleas).
- Levey settled her claim against Manley prior to trial.
- The action against DeNardo proceeded to a jury trial.
- The trial court instructed the jury that Levey was protected by the sudden emergency doctrine but refused DeNardo’s request for the same instruction, instead instructing the jury to apply only the assured clear distance ahead rule to DeNardo.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Levey for $1,320,000, apportioning 80% liability to DeNardo and 20% to Manley.
- Upon consideration of post-trial motions filed by the DeNardos, the trial court granted a new trial, limited solely to damages, finding the verdict excessive.
- Levey filed a cross-appeal in the Superior Court (an intermediate appellate court), arguing the trial court erred in finding the verdict excessive.
- The DeNardos appealed to the Superior Court, arguing the new trial should include the issue of liability, that the apportionment of liability was unsubstantiated, and that the refusal to charge on the sudden emergency doctrine was error.
- The Superior Court, in a two-to-one memorandum decision, affirmed the trial court's order.
- Judge Cavanaugh filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in the Superior Court, agreeing a new trial on damages was warranted and the sudden emergency instruction for DeNardo was properly refused, but disagreeing that damages and liability were not intertwined and that the apportionment of liability was rational.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine for Appellant Roland DeNardo, thereby requiring a new trial on both liability and damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Cappy, Justice
Yes, the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine for Appellant Roland DeNardo, thereby requiring a new trial on both liability and damages. The Court reiterated the definitions of the assured clear distance ahead rule and the sudden emergency doctrine as previously established in Lockhart v. List. While the assured clear distance ahead rule requires a motorist to stop within the distance they can clearly see, it does not mandate anticipating all possible occurrences, only those reasonably expected. The sudden emergency doctrine, conversely, offers a defense to a driver unexpectedly confronted with a perilous situation not of their own making, where they have little opportunity to react and are thus not held to the “usual degree of care.” The Court found that, just as in Lockhart, there was insufficient evidence to unequivocally establish that DeNardo was driving in an unsafe manner in violation of the assured clear distance ahead rule. DeNardo's testimony regarding distances and Manley's sudden turn did not clearly demonstrate his negligence caused the collision. The Superior Court's reliance on Elder v. Orluck and a hypothetical in Cannon v. Tabor was deemed inapposite, as neither case explicitly prohibited a trailing driver from invoking the sudden emergency doctrine, nor did they involve similar factual scenarios where an emergency was indisputably created by a third party. Therefore, it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that DeNardo could also be judged based on the sudden emergency doctrine defense.
Concurring - Justice Nigro
Justice Nigro concurred in the result of the majority opinion, indicating agreement with the ultimate outcome of reversing and remanding for a new trial on both liability and damages.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine, particularly for trailing vehicles in multi-car accidents where a third party creates the emergency. It reinforces that the assured clear distance ahead rule does not impose a duty to anticipate all remote occurrences, preventing its misapplication to automatically assign fault to a trailing driver without considering sudden external events. The ruling underscores the importance of proper jury instructions to ensure defendants receive the benefit of available defenses, potentially influencing how negligence is assessed in complex chain-reaction collisions and preventing the misinterpretation of traffic laws.
