Lettley v. State

Majority - Raker, J.

Yes. A trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to withdraw under these circumstances violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The court distinguished between two standards for evaluating conflict of interest claims based on when the issue is raised. When counsel raises a potential conflict with the court pre-trial, as was done here, the standard from Holloway v. Arkansas applies, which requires the court to take adequate steps to resolve the conflict. If the court improperly requires the representation to continue over a timely objection, prejudice is presumed and reversal is automatic. This contrasts with the Cuyler v. Sullivan standard, which applies when a conflict claim is raised for the first time post-trial and requires the defendant to show that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. Here, an actual conflict existed because counsel's duty of loyalty to Lettley was directly opposed to her duty of confidentiality to the confessing client. To zealously defend Lettley by suggesting another person was the shooter, counsel would have to implicate her other client, creating an irreconcilable division of loyalties. The trial court's reasoning—that a new lawyer would not have the confidential information and thus Lettley was not disadvantaged—was incorrect because the conflict is inherent in the divided loyalties of the current attorney, not in the availability of the information to others. The court also rejected the trial judge's concern about defendants manufacturing conflicts for delay, citing Holloway for the principle that a lawyer's representation as an officer of the court regarding a conflict should generally be credited.