LeTran Tran v. Minnesota Life Insurance Comp
922 F.3d 380 (2019)
Rule of Law:
Under federal common law governing ERISA-regulated insurance plans, a death resulting from autoerotic asphyxiation is deemed an 'intentionally self-inflicted injury' for purposes of an accidental death and dismemberment policy exclusion, because the act of intentionally strangling oneself constitutes an injury as commonly understood, irrespective of the insured's intent to survive.
Facts:
- In August 2016, Linno Llenos, while home alone in Wilmette, Illinois, prepared a noose from a ceiling beam and stood on a stool with the noose around his neck.
- Llenos stepped off the stool to engage in autoerotic asphyxiation, a sexual practice where a person purposefully restricts blood flow to the brain to induce euphoria.
- Llenos died as a result of this act.
- LeTran Tran, Llenos's widow, found his body hanging in the basement upon returning home and called the police.
- The medical examiner subsequently concluded from sexual paraphernalia on Llenos's body that he died performing autoerotic asphyxiation, rather than suicide.
- Llenos was covered by two life insurance policies from Minnesota Life Insurance Company, which included Accidental Death & Dismemberment (AD&D) policy riders providing an additional $60,000 in coverage.
Procedural Posture:
- LeTran Tran filed a claim with Minnesota Life Insurance Company for the proceeds from Linno Llenos's ERISA-governed life insurance policies, including Accidental Death & Dismemberment (AD&D) coverage.
- Minnesota Life paid Tran for the basic life insurance policies but denied her claim for the $60,000 AD&D coverage, stating Llenos's death was not accidental and fell under an exclusion for 'intentionally self-inflicted injury.'
- Tran appealed Minnesota Life's decision internally, but the denial was upheld.
- Tran then filed an action against Minnesota Life in the federal district court under ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)) to obtain the denied AD&D benefits.
- The district court, after reviewing stipulated facts from both parties, awarded judgment in favor of Tran, ruling that Llenos's death qualified as accidental and did not result from an intentionally self-inflicted injury, interpreting policy ambiguities in favor of coverage.
- Minnesota Life Insurance Company appealed the district court's judgment to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does death caused by autoerotic asphyxiation, where the insured intentionally restricts blood flow to the brain but does not intend to die, fall under an accidental death and dismemberment policy exclusion for 'intentionally self-inflicted injury' under federal common law governing ERISA plans?
Opinions:
Majority - Brennan, Circuit Judge
Yes, death caused by autoerotic asphyxiation falls under the policy exclusion for 'intentionally self-inflicted injury' because the act of intentionally strangling oneself, even partially, constitutes an injury as commonly understood by a reasonable person, regardless of the desired recreational side effects or intent to survive. The court applied federal common law to interpret policy terms in their 'ordinary and popular sense,' as understood by a person of average intelligence. It rejected the reasoning of other circuits (e.g., Padfield, Critchlow) that artificially separate the continuous act of autoerotic asphyxiation into distinct, severable phases, stating that the act of strangulation itself, which causes hypoxia, euphoria, blackout, and death, is one continuous, causally linked event. The court found that 'partial strangulation' is an 'injury' as commonly understood, citing examples from criminal codes where non-lethal strangulation is a prosecutable offense. It held that the pleasurable aim or popularity of autoerotic asphyxiation does not negate the injurious nature of the act. Applying the subjective/objective test for 'intentionally self-inflicted injury' from Santaella, the court determined that Llenos's subjective intent to perform the act of strangulation was clear. Since the act of strangulation is an injury, Llenos intentionally inflicted that injury upon himself, making the policy exclusion applicable without needing to assess an intent to die.
Dissenting - Bauer, Circuit Judge
No, death caused by autoerotic asphyxiation should not fall under the policy exclusion for 'intentionally self-inflicted injury' because reasonable people could conclude that the cerebral hypoxia was not an intentional injury, and Llenos's death was an unexpected accident, creating an ambiguity that should be construed in favor of coverage. The dissenting judge argued that the majority incorrectly separates the masturbatory act from the asphyxiation, viewing it instead as one 'global process.' Applying the Santaella subjective/objective test to determine if the act was injurious, the dissent asserted Llenos had a subjective expectation of survival and avoiding injury, evidenced by his wife's testimony against suicidal intent and prophylactic measures taken (towel around neck, foot on stool, possible release mechanism). The dissent also contended that this expectation was objectively reasonable, given that autoerotic asphyxiation is widely practiced without injury, suggesting injury is not a 'substantial certainty.' The judge analogized Llenos's conduct to that of thrill-seekers (like skydivers), who intentionally engage in risky activities but do not intend injury or death. Concluding that reasonable minds could differ on whether autoerotic asphyxiation constitutes an 'intentionally inflicted injury,' the dissent argued that this ambiguity in the policy terms must be resolved in favor of the insured, and that Minnesota Life should explicitly exclude such dangerous activities if it wishes to deny coverage.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the interpretation of 'intentionally self-inflicted injury' exclusions in ERISA-governed accidental death and dismemberment policies, particularly concerning autoerotic asphyxiation. It directly rejects the 'severable act' theory adopted by some other circuits, asserting that the act of strangulation itself is an injury, regardless of the insured's intent to survive or desired recreational effects. This ruling solidifies a stricter application of such exclusions within the Seventh Circuit, potentially leading to more consistent denials of AD&D claims for deaths resulting from autoerotic asphyxiation. The emphasis on the direct physical harm over the decedent's subjective intent to avoid fatality may influence other circuits to reconsider their approaches, promoting a broader interpretation of what constitutes an 'injury' in these contexts.
