Lester v. Powers
596 A.2d 65, 1991 Me. LEXIS 195 (1991)
Rule of Law:
A conditional privilege protects statements of opinion made by a former student in a letter submitted during a university's tenure review process from claims of libel, provided the statements were not made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for their truth or falsity, and were not made solely out of ill-will.
Facts:
- Mary Jane Powers was a Colby College undergraduate majoring in psychology, and Lewis F. Lester was an associate professor at the college.
- In early 1985, Powers took Lester's abnormal psychology class, which included a discussion of homosexuality that Powers, who was coming to understand she was a lesbian, found offensive.
- Powers subsequently complained about Lester's handling of the subject to an assistant dean and other members of the Colby community.
- In the fall of 1986, Lester underwent a tenure review process, and the Committee on Promotion and Tenure solicited letters from former students by an October 15 deadline.
- After the deadline, Powers contacted the Dean of the Faculty, was invited to comment, and submitted a letter stating her "strong opinions" that Lester should not be tenured, citing her personal discomfort and observations about his conduct.
- The Committee on Promotion and Tenure initially voted not to recommend Lester for tenure, but after his rebuttal, reversed its decision and recommended tenure.
- The President of Colby College independently reviewed Lester's file, recommended against tenure to the board of trustees, and the board ultimately denied tenure to Lester.
Procedural Posture:
- Lewis F. Lester filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court (trial court) in February 1988, seeking damages from Mary Jane E. Powers for libel and tortious interference with contract, and punitive damages.
- In February 1989, Powers moved for summary judgment, which the Superior Court denied.
- Simultaneously, Lester's motion to amend his complaint to incorporate a claim for slander based on Powers's oral statements was granted by the Superior Court.
- Powers again moved for summary judgment in August 1990, arguing that she enjoyed a 'qualified privilege.'
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment for Powers on Lester's claims for libel, slander, and tortious interference with contract.
- Lester filed a motion requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the Superior Court treated as a motion for reconsideration and denied.
- Lester appealed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (appellant Lewis F. Lester, appellee Mary Jane E. Powers).
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Issue:
Did the Superior Court err in granting summary judgment, finding that a former student's letter containing statements of opinion about a professor's conduct, submitted during his university tenure review process, was protected by a conditional privilege against a claim of libel?
Opinions:
Majority - COLLINS, Justice
No, the Superior Court did not err in granting summary judgment, because a former student's letter containing statements of opinion about a professor's conduct, submitted during his university tenure review process, was protected by a conditional privilege against a claim of libel. The court reasoned that a conditional privilege applies in situations like tenure review where candid communication is important, and Powers's letter was solicited by the college and furthered its interests in the tenure process. The court found no evidence that Powers abused this privilege by submitting the letter after the deadline, as the college welcomed her comments, nor by acting solely out of ill-will, as the record indicated her purpose was to further the tenure review. Furthermore, the court determined that Powers’s letter expressed subjective personal observations and opinions under the 'totality of the circumstances' test, rather than objective statements of fact. Even assuming the letter implied undisclosed defamatory facts, Lester failed to provide sufficient evidence to generate a factual issue that Powers knew such implications were false or acted with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity, as required to overcome the conditional privilege. (The court also affirmed summary judgment for the slander claim regarding oral statements due to insufficient evidence to determine if they were false, defamatory, or privileged, as noted in a footnote, but the primary reasoning focused on the libel claim concerning the letter.)
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of conditional privilege in academic settings, particularly concerning tenure review. It reinforces that open and candid evaluations are crucial for institutions and are protected from defamation claims unless the statements are known to be false or made with reckless disregard for truth, or solely from spite. The ruling emphasizes the high bar plaintiffs face in overcoming summary judgment in such cases, especially when relying on speculative inferences rather than concrete evidence of 'actual malice.' This decision ensures that individuals, including former students, can provide honest feedback in important institutional processes without undue fear of litigation, while still holding them accountable for knowingly false or reckless statements.
