Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital
305 P.2d 36, 1956 Cal. LEXIS 300, 47 Cal. 2d 509 (1956)
Rule of Law:
An inference of negligence, including one arising from res ipsa loquitur, can be dispelled as a matter of law by clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence from any party, including testimony of adverse witnesses called under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2055, provided such evidence cannot rationally be disbelieved.
Facts:
- Plaintiff underwent an abdominal operation at Watsonville Community Hospital.
- Doctors Lacy and Slegal commenced the operation, with Kay Pogatschnik, a hospital employee, acting as surgical nurse, and the hospital furnishing all equipment and instruments.
- Doctor Eiskamp assisted in a portion of the operation, making a visual inspection of the gall bladder and later working with Slegal on a mass in the lower left quadrant of the abdomen.
- During the operation, Doctors Lacy and Slegal used about 18 Kelly clamps; Doctor Eiskamp testified he used only curved clamps and none in the upper portion of plaintiff's abdomen.
- Plaintiff was unconscious during the entire five-hour operation.
- Plaintiff experienced considerable pain for 10 days post-operation and for several months after returning home.
- Approximately six months after the operation, X-ray pictures revealed a 6-inch Kelly clamp lodged in the upper right quadrant of plaintiff’s abdomen.
- The Kelly clamp was surgically removed from plaintiff’s abdomen.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages against Watsonville Community Hospital, Doctors Lacy, Slegal, Eiskamp, and surgical nurse Kay Pogatschnik.
- At the close of plaintiff's case presentation, motions for nonsuit were granted by the trial court as to Doctor Eiskamp, Kay Pogatschnik, and Watsonville Community Hospital.
- Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of nonsuit.
- The case against Doctors Lacy and Slegal was settled after the nonsuits were granted as to the other defendants.
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Issue:
Can an inference of negligence, arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, be dispelled as a matter of law by testimony elicited from adverse witnesses under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2055 during a motion for nonsuit, despite the statutory provision that a plaintiff is not bound by such testimony?
Opinions:
Majority - Gibson, C.J.
Yes, an inference of negligence, including one arising from res ipsa loquitur, can be dispelled as a matter of law by clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence from any party, including testimony of adverse witnesses called under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2055, provided such evidence cannot rationally be disbelieved. The court reasoned that an inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur arises when an unusual injury occurs while a patient is unconscious, placing a burden of explanation on all those in control of the patient or instrumentalities. To dispel such an inference as a matter of law, the evidence produced must be clear, positive, uncontradicted, and rationally indisputable. Testimony elicited under Section 2055 is considered evidence in the case, and the provision that a party is not 'bound' by such testimony merely means they can rebut or impeach it, not that it lacks evidentiary weight. The court found that the testimony of Doctors Lacy, Slegal, and Eiskamp, concerning Eiskamp's limited role and non-use of Kelly clamps in the relevant area, was clear, uncontradicted, and adverse to Lacy and Slegal's self-interest, making it rationally credible. Therefore, the res ipsa loquitur inference against Eiskamp was dispelled. However, the testimony of Superintendent Craig regarding the hospital's practice of not counting instruments was given by an interested party and would not, even if believed, conclusively establish due care, as counting instruments is a matter of common knowledge and custom does not excuse general negligence. Thus, the inference against the hospital and nurse was not dispelled.
Concurring_in_part_and_dissenting_in_part - Carter, J.
No, evidence elicited from adverse witnesses under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2055 cannot, as a matter of law, dispel an inference of negligence in the context of a nonsuit motion, because the plaintiff is not bound by unfavorable testimony from such witnesses and all favorable inferences must be indulged. Justice Carter argued that Section 2055 explicitly states that a party calling an adverse witness is not 'bound by his testimony,' rendering it illogical to use such testimony to dispel an inference favoring the plaintiff on a motion for nonsuit. He asserted that on a nonsuit motion, only evidence favorable to the plaintiff, and all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom, should be considered, while unfavorable evidence must be disregarded. He contended that the majority's reliance on Crouch v. Gilmore Oil Co., Ltd. was misplaced and that Crowe v. McBride (authored by the Chief Justice himself) correctly stated that adverse testimony should only be treated as evidence 'insofar as it is favorable to plaintiffs.' Furthermore, he highlighted that the res ipsa loquitur inference is a 'special kind of inference' akin to a presumption that defendants must actively rebut, and issues of witness credibility are for the trier of fact on the merits, not for a nonsuit motion. The failure to count instruments is also a matter within the ken of a layman, and custom does not excuse negligence.
Dissenting - Shenk, J.
No, the majority misapplied Section 2055 and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; a plaintiff calling defendants as adverse witnesses under Section 2055 is not bound by their testimony, and unfavorable portions should be disregarded for a nonsuit motion. Justice Shenk concurred with Justice Carter, emphasizing that under Section 2055, a plaintiff is not prejudiced by calling adverse witnesses and is not bound by their testimony. For a nonsuit motion, any testimony unfavorable to the plaintiff must be disregarded, regardless of its strength, while all favorable portions and inferences must support the plaintiff’s case. He argued that the res ipsa loquitur inference in this case was sufficient to warrant a trial on the merits and was not legally dispelled by the adverse witness testimony. He concluded that the majority's ruling effectively undermines the beneficial purpose of res ipsa loquitur by forcing plaintiffs to risk a nonsuit when examining defendants.
Analysis:
This case significantly shaped the application of California's Code of Civil Procedure Section 2055 (adverse witness examination) in conjunction with the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, particularly at the nonsuit stage. It clarified that while plaintiffs are not 'bound' by adverse testimony, such testimony can still, under specific conditions of clarity and uncontroverted nature, dispel an inference of negligence as a matter of law. The dissenting opinions underscore the inherent tension and potential for injustice when seemingly non-binding testimony is used to defeat a plaintiff's case before a jury trial. The case also reiterated the principle that adherence to customary, but negligent, practices does not excuse a failure to exercise due care, particularly for simple tasks like instrument counting, thereby setting a higher standard for professional conduct in medical settings.
